United Nations S/2018/600

Security Council

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# Letter dated 12 June 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a document of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), presenting its position on the recommendations contained in the ninth report (S/2018/466) of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004), which was submitted to the Committee in accordance with paragraph (a) of the annex to resolution 2255 (2015).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the position paper were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Kairat **Umarov**
Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)

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# Position of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) on the recommendations contained in the ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

1. On 30 April 2018, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted its ninth report (S/2018/466) to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). The Committee is of the opinion that all Member States should be made aware of the Monitoring Team's recommendations and the Committee's position thereon. The paragraph numbers indicated below refer to the ninth report of the Monitoring Team.

## Taliban finances and connections to criminal organizations

2. In paragraph 34, the Monitoring Team recommended that the Committee write to all Member States, reminding them of the Taliban's strategic significance to the world supply of opium (and therefore heroin) and of the capacity that exists and is developing to analyse drug consignments and pinpoint their origin, and encouraging Member States worldwide that have information that credibly links heroin dealers to supplies originating from Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan to consider putting forward those individuals (regardless of nationality or location) for listing under the sanctions regime established under resolution 1988 (2011). The Committee will act accordingly and agrees to write to Member States, encouraging those that have information that credibly links heroin dealers to supplies originating from Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan to consider putting forward those individuals for listing under the 1988 (2011) sanctions regime.

3. In paragraph 35, the Monitoring Team recommended that the Committee write to all Member States, drawing attention to the importance of short shelf-life chemical precursors to the production of heroin from opium and encouraging them to enhance measures to control the production, distribution and export of such chemicals to Afghanistan. The Committee will act accordingly and agrees to write to all Member States, drawing their attention to the importance of short shelf-life chemical precursors to the production of heroin from opium, and encouraging them to enhance measures to control the production, distribution and export of such chemicals to Afghanistan.

## Sanctions implementation

4. Given the momentum generated by the Kabul Process and the importance of increasing international engagement to persuade the Taliban to respond positively to it, the Monitoring Team recommended in paragraph 65 that the Committee write to all Member States, highlighting the importance of using the 1988 (2011) sanctions regime to encourage and facilitate such engagement and the requirement that any international travel of listed persons be submitted in accordance with the exemption procedures set out in paragraphs 19 and 20 of Security Council resolution 2255 (2015). The Committee will act accordingly and agrees to write to all Member States, highlighting the importance of using the 1988 (2011) sanctions regime to encourage and facilitate such engagement and the requirement that any international travel of listed persons be submitted in accordance with the exemption procedures set out in paragraphs 19 and 20 of resolution 2255 (2015).

5. Given the importance of the various constituent elements to the production of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan and the importance of explosive materials, detonating cords and detonators to illegal mining activities (from which militants derive significant income), the Monitoring Team recommended in

paragraph 72 that the Committee write to Member States, urging them to work with the Government of Afghanistan to ensure that such items are supplied only to legitimate end users. This will require an increase in international information-sharing, the full use of Member States' national laws, the raising of public and private sector awareness of the sensitivity of these items and the development of strong "know-your-customer" cultures, so as to ensure that such items do not fall into the hands of militants. The Committee will act accordingly and agrees to write to Member States, urging them to work with the Government of Afghanistan to ensure that such items are supplied only to legitimate end users and highlighting to them that this will require an increase in international information-sharing, the full use of Member States' national laws, the raising of public and private sector awareness of the sensitivity of these items and the development of strong "know-your-customer" cultures, so as to ensure that such items do not fall into the hands of militants.

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**Letter dated 12 June 2018 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit herewith the fifth report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues, which covers the period from 1 December 2017 to 12 June 2018.

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Karel J.G. **van Oosterom**
Security Council Facilitator
for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

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# Report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues

1. This is the fifth report of the Joint Commission, established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues. It provides an overview of the work undertaken by the Procurement Working Group from 1 December 2017 to 12 June 2018.

2. The Procurement Working Group comprises the States that are participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with a designated representative of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy serving as Coordinator.

3. The Procurement Working Group held seven meetings. Representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency participated as observers in one of the meetings. The Procurement Working Group reviewed 13 proposals from three States: 8 were recommended for approval, 2 were withdrawn by the proposing States and 3 are currently under review.

4. Documents relating to the work of the Procurement Working Group, as endorsed by the Joint Commission and updated in September 2017, are publicly available, including through the Security Council website dedicated to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

5. The participants in the Procurement Working Group continued to engage with Member States to raise awareness of the procurement channel process and to explain the role and objectives of the Procurement Working Group. The Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group also addressed representatives of the Security Council in the "2231 format" on the procurement channel process on 27 April 2018.

6. On 9 May 2018, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group was informed that the United States of America was withdrawing from the Procurement Working Group, following the announcement of the President of the United States on 8 May 2018.[1] As of 9 May, the United States does not participate in the Procurement Working Group activities, including the review of proposals submitted to it. The work of the Procurement Working Group will continue without the participation of the United States.

[1] "Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action", available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/.

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# Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

## Fifth report of the Secretary-General

## I. Introduction

1. Almost three years ago, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, marking the culmination of 12 years of intense diplomatic efforts to reach a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The Plan, which was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2231 (2015), laid out reciprocal commitments.

2. Since 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 11 times to the Security Council that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In its most recent quarterly reports (see S/2018/205 and S/2018/540), the Agency again reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing. The Agency also reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and to apply the transparency measures set out in the Plan. In its latest report, the Agency further indicated that it had conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit.

3. Notwithstanding the continued adherence by the Islamic Republic of Iran to its nuclear-related commitments, the agreement is unfortunately at a crossroads. On 8 May 2018, the United States of America announced its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the re-imposition of all national sanctions that had been lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan. I deeply regret this setback to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation that has contributed to regional and international peace and security. I believe that issues not directly related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.

4. I take note of the letter dated 11 May 2018 addressed to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (see A/72/869-S/2018/453), in which he indicated that the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue to abide by the

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agreement as long as the full benefits that the Iranian people were entitled to were guaranteed. I welcome the reaffirmation by the remaining participants, on 25 May 2018 in Vienna, of their commitment to the continued, full and effective implementation of the Plan.

5. It is important to recall that the Security Council, in its resolution 2231 (2015), urged the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the timetable established in the Plan. The Council further called upon all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to support its implementation and to refrain from actions that undermine the implementation of commitments under the Plan. In this regard, it is important that the withdrawal of one country not impede the ability of others to fully implement their commitments under the Plan or to engage in activities consistent with resolution 2231 (2015) and the provisions and objectives of the Plan.

6. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is only one part of resolution 2231 (2015). A number of Member States that support the Plan have expressed concerns about Iranian activities allegedly undertaken contrary to the restrictive measures set out in annex B to the resolution. Therefore, I again encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider those concerns.

7. The present report, the fifth on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the issuance of the fourth report of the Secretary-General (S/2017/1030), on 8 December 2017. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.

## II. Key findings and recommendations

8. Since 8 December 2017, 13 additional proposals to participate in or permit activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran for nuclear or non-nuclear civilian end-uses have been submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement channel. Meanwhile, the Secretariat received information from two Member States on the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods and technology allegedly undertaken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The Secretariat has sought clarification on that information from all relevant Member States, and I intend to report back to the Security Council accordingly.

9. In relation to the above, and on the basis of feedback received by the Secretariat during its outreach activities, I call upon all Member States to continue their efforts to promote awareness and understanding of the procurement channel, the procedures for submission of proposals and the process for their review. The Secretariat stands ready to further assist Member States in such efforts, in line with the arrangements and procedures outlined in the note by the President of the Security Council dated 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44).

10. The Secretariat has carefully reviewed all information and material available regarding the allegations of the transfer of ballistic missiles, parts thereof or related technology by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Houthis in Yemen that may have been used in ballistic missile launches aimed at the territory of Saudi Arabia. On the basis of the information and material analysed, it is the assessment of the Secretariat that the debris of five missiles launched at Yanbu' and Riyadh since July 2017 share

key design features with a known type of missile manufactured by the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is also the assessment of the Secretariat that some component parts of the debris were manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the Secretariat has not yet been able to determine when such missiles, parts thereof or related technology may have been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in particular whether the transfer(s) occurred after 16 January 2016, the day the restrictions set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) came into force.[1]

11. In February 2018, Israel brought to my attention information regarding the possible presence of an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the Syrian Arab Republic, which Israel stated had been intercepted and shot down after entering Israeli airspace. While the Secretariat has not yet had the opportunity to examine the debris, Iranian media outlets have reported that various Iranian UAVs have been deployed in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat has no information regarding the owner or operator of that UAV.

12. The Secretariat was invited to examine arms and related materiel seized by Bahrain after 16 January 2016. The Secretariat also concluded its review of the unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives recovered by the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates. In both instances, the Secretariat is confident that some of the arms and related materiel it examined are of Iranian manufacture. However, it has found no indications of whether those items were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.[2]

13. On 21 May 2018, the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, stated in a televised interview that the Islamic Republic of Iran had provided the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and other armed groups in Gaza with "money, [military] equipment and expertise", including after the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. Any Iranian arms transfers after 16 January 2016 would have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

14. Iranian entities continue to participate in foreign arms exhibitions, including the Defence Industries Organization, an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). Since the issuance of my previous report, Major General Qasem Soleimani appears to have continued to travel to Iraq despite the travel ban provisions of the resolution and previous reporting on this issue. I reiterate my call upon all Member States in the region to take the steps necessary to fully implement their obligations in relation to resolution 2231 (2015), including those regarding the travel ban and asset freeze with respect to individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).

## III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

15. In its resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council endorsed the establishment of a dedicated procurement channel, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to review proposals by States seeking to engage in certain transfers of nuclear or dual-use goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Through that channel, the Council reviews and decides on recommendations from the Joint

[1] Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 7 of that resolution. The provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and those of other previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue were terminated on 16 January 2016.

[2] Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council resolution 1747 (2007) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 5 of that resolution.

Commission established under the Plan, regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

16. Since 8 December 2017, 13 new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) have been submitted to the Security Council, bringing to 37 the total number of proposals submitted since Implementation Day (16 January 2016) for approval through the procurement channel. At the time of reporting, 24 proposals had been approved by the Council, 3 had been disapproved, 7 had been withdrawn by the proposing States and 3 were currently under review.

17. In addition, the Security Council received 13 new notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) for certain nuclear-related activities that do not require approval, but do require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission.

18. Since my previous report, the Secretariat received information on the supply, sale, transfer or export to the Islamic Republic of Iran of dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that may have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In a letter dated 19 April 2018, the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates brought to the attention of the Secretariat information and documents related to four shipments of dual-use items. Those shipments were seized by the authorities of the United Arab Emirates while in transit to the Islamic Republic of Iran in May 2016 and in April, July and December 2017. The authorities of the United Arab Emirates assessed, on the basis of the declared technical specifications or specialized tests, that the items involved (40 cylindrical segments of tungsten, 1 inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer, 10 capacitors, and 1 titanium rod) met the criteria set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 and that their transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran would have required prior approval from the Security Council.

19. In addition, on 27 April 2018, the authorities of the United States informed the Secretariat that, in their assessment, two commodities (carbon fibre and aluminium alloys) that had been transferred to the Islamic Republic of Iran over the past year without prior approval from the Security Council met the criteria set out in the above-mentioned information circular.

20. In response to requests for clarification on the above-mentioned information, several Member States informed the Secretariat that they had initiated internal reviews and would provide additional information as soon as those reviews were concluded. In a letter dated 1 June 2018, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated, inter alia, that it was "the responsibility of the exporting State to seek approval through the procurement channel" and encouraged the Secretariat to undertake more outreach activities to address the lack of awareness among some Member States. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course as more information becomes available.

# IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions

## A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran

21. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.

22. In identical letters dated 23 May 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/495), the Permanent Representative of Israel brought to my attention information regarding two flight tests of ballistic missiles by the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to the information provided, a Shahab-3 variant and a Scud variant were flight tested on 2 and 5 January 2018, respectively. The Permanent Representative of Israel considered that those two ballistic missiles were both category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime "capable of delivering a nuclear payload of 500 kg with a range of over 300 km," and that their test-firing was in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). In a letter dated 29 May 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/511), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that there was no reference to the criteria of the Missile Technology Control Regime in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and underscored that "none of the ballistic missiles of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons".

## B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran

23. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States, provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in S/2015/546,[3] the provision of various services or assistance, and the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of an interest in certain commercial ballistic missile activities. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

24. In my previous report, I informed the Council of the possible transfer of ballistic missiles, parts thereof or related technology by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Houthis in Yemen that may have been used in the ballistic missile launches aimed at the territory of Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017 (see S/2017/1030, paras. 28 and 29). Since then, Saudi authorities have brought to the attention of the Secretariat nine additional launches of ballistic missiles by the Houthis, which, in their assessment, were Iranian Qiam-1 ballistic missiles (see S/2017/1133, S/2018/266, S/2018/337 and S/2018/448).[4]

25. In letters addressed to me and the Security Council (see S/2018/123, S/2018/145, S/2018/278, S/2018/424 and S/2018/533), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that, inter alia, the Islamic Republic of Iran "neither has a policy nor seeks to transfer arms or military equipment in Yemen or manufacture them therein". In addition, he noted that the Yemeni Government had "notable stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles that could have been utilized by its local expertise as technical bases for further upgrades". In this regard, the Secretariat notes that, in an interview with France 24 on 31 March 2018, the head of the Houthi revolutionary committee, Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, stated that the Houthis were developing and manufacturing their own missiles based on missiles provided by the former Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea prior to the outbreak of the current conflict.

[3] The items, materials, equipment, goods and technology concerned are those set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime list (S/2015/546, annex) and any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

[4] The nine additional launches reportedly occurred on 19 December 2017 (1), and on 5 January (1), 30 January (1), 25 March (3), 11 April (1) and 9 May 2018 (2).

26. During the reporting period, Saudi authorities invited the Secretariat to examine the debris which they stated were of three ballistic missiles launched at its territory on 19 December 2017 and on 5 and 30 January 2018. The Secretariat also had the opportunity to re-examine the debris of the two missiles launched at the territory of Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017. It is the assessment of the Secretariat that the debris of the five missiles share key design features with a known type of missile manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is also the assessment of the Secretariat that some component parts in the debris had been manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the Secretariat has not yet been able to determine when such missiles, parts thereof or related technology may have been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular whether the transfer(s) occurred after 16 January 2016.

27. The Secretariat conducted first-hand and in-depth examinations of debris recovered by Saudi authorities and collected all other information and material available, including photographs and videos of the debris in situ. The Secretariat visited several locations in and around Riyadh to confirm impact sites and that the debris seen in images and videos provided by the Saudi authorities or available on social media corresponded to the debris presented to the Secretariat. Whenever possible, the Secretariat carried out a visual comparison to determine whether the features of the debris of the missiles examined were consistent with those of the missiles seen in the videos of the launches released by the Houthis.

28. The Secretariat observed that the debris of the missiles airframes were made of aluminium, painted a tan colour and bore similar markings in English script and in white lettering. Other than the debris of the missile launched on 22 July 2017, the Secretariat observed that the airframes had been painted over in blue. The Secretariat further observed that the debris of the five missiles examined had identical internal and external design characteristics, with the following features that are consistent with those of the Scud-B missile and all its variants:

(a) They were all single stage and liquid-fuelled missiles;

(b) They had a diameter of 880 mm;

(c) They were powered by a single-chamber rocket engine fed by a turbopump;

(d) The steering mechanism consisted of four graphite vanes in the motor exhaust section.

29. The Secretariat also determined from its observations of the debris that the missiles had the following specific features:

(a) The fuel and oxidizer tanks were longer than those of the Scud-B missile, while the guidance section was shorter;

(b) The oxidizer tank was split in two sections and located above the fuel tank;

(c) The fuel tanks had three external valves, while the oxidizer tanks had six (due to the split sections), bringing the total number of external valves per missile to nine (the positioning pattern was consistent across all five missiles);

(d) They were finless and had no observable features suggesting that the fins had been removed post-factory production;[5]

[5] On four of the missiles examined, small stabilizers had been affixed to the jet vane housings. Paint and markings observed underneath the stabilizers indicate that they had been added after the tan paint and white markings were applied.

(e) Retrieved guidance components had been built with modern digital subcomponents;

(f) They had a separable re-entry vehicle.[6]

30. On the basis of all available information and material at its disposal, including information and photographs published by Iranian media outlets, it is the understanding of the Secretariat that the above-mentioned features are consistent with those of the Iranian Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missile. In addition, it is the understanding of the Secretariat that the Qiam-1 is the only known Scud variant with nine external valves and without fins.

31. In addition, all examined jet vane actuators bore the casting of a logo and the abbreviation "S.B.I". The logo matches that of an Iranian entity, Shahid Bagheri Industries.[7] The abbreviation is consistent with the name of that entity. The Secretariat also observed partly burned yellow safety labels with the words "quality assurance" in Farsi and the number "6000" on some actuators parts. Burn marks consistent with the dimensions of those safety labels were observed on the other actuators parts. The Secretariat observed similar yellow safety labels with the number "6000" on other retrieved guidance components. The Secretariat further observed that one printed circuit board in another guidance component was marked "SHIG 6081". As indicated in the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), "SHIG" is a known abbreviation for the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, which is reportedly responsible for the liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

32. Moreover, according to the information provided to the Secretariat by foreign manufacturing companies, most of the retrieved guidance subcomponents had been produced between 2002 and 2010.[8] This production date range is incompatible with that of the Scud missiles provided by the former Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Yemen and that were known to be in Yemeni stockpiles prior to the outbreak of the current conflict in early 2015. The latest delivery of Scud missiles to Yemen by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reportedly occurred in late 2002.[9]

33. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), since 16 January 2016, prior approval of the Security Council is also required for, inter alia, the supply, sale or transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran of complete UAV systems (including target drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of a range equal to or greater than 300 km.[10] In identical letters dated 10 February 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/111), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the UAV intercepted and downed that same day after entering Israeli airspace was an Iranian UAV launched from a site in eastern Homs, Syrian Arab Republic. In follow-up identical letters dated 13 April 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/349), the Permanent Representative of Israel indicated that further analysis of its flight path and debris had led Israeli authorities to conclude that the UAV "was armed with explosives and was intended to attack Israeli territory". In letters dated 20 February and 9 May 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/142 and S/2018/445), the

[6] According to videos of the launches released by the Houthis, the separable re-entry vehicle had a triconic shape.

[7] As seen on the website www.shahidbagheri.ir/, accessed through the website of Wayback Machine (https://web.archive.org/).

[8] Some subcomponents had been produced in the 1990s. None appears to have been produced after July 2010.

[9] See "Yemeni rebels enhance ballistic missile campaign", Jane's Intelligence Review, 10 July 2017.

[10] See S/2015/546, item 19.A.2.

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the aforementioned letters from the Permanent Representative of Israel contained "misleading information and accusations". The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran further stated that "operational details that were provided to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran illustrate that the unmanned aerial vehicle was flying inside Syria near the border with Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territories for the purpose of monitoring and surveillance of ISIL and other terrorist groups there", and that it had been unarmed and not intended to engage in an attack anywhere.

34. Images of the debris of the UAV downed on 10 February 2018 provided to the Secretariat by Israeli authorities showed that its wing configuration appeared to be consistent with that of the Iranian Sae'qeh (Thunder) UAV, which, according to Iranian media outlets, had been unveiled in October 2016.[11] According to information provided by Israeli authorities, the UAV flew at a range that meets the specified criteria before its interception. No information is available to the Secretariat as to the owner or operator of that UAV. The Secretariat notes that, according to Iranian media outlets, other UAVs, including the Shahed-129, had been previously deployed by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Syrian Arab Republic.[12] It is also the understanding of the Secretariat that the Shahed-129 meets the specified range criteria. One Shahed-129 was reportedly shot down in southern Syrian Arab Republic on 20 June 2017.[13]

# V. Implementation of arms-related provisions

## A. Restrictions on arms-related transfers to the Islamic Republic of Iran

35. As stipulated in paragraph 5 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States, provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts. Prior approval from the Council is also required for the provision to the Islamic Republic of Iran of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of those arms and related materiel. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been approved by the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

36. In a letter dated 15 May 2018, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine indicated to the Secretariat that the Security Service of Ukraine had prevented an attempt by two Iranian nationals to procure and transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran component parts of the "Kh-31" (AS-17 "Krypton") air-to-surface missile and

[11] For example, see Mehr News Agency, "IRGC inaugurates its latest drone 'Thunder'", 1 October 2016. Available from https://en.mehrnews.com/news/120176/IRGC-inaugurates-its-latest-drone-Thunder.

[12] See Fars News Agency, "Iran's Shahed-129 drone in combat operations in Syria", 4 February 2016. Available at http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13941115000734; and Mehr News Agency, "Iran's Mohajer-6, Qaem bomb deadly weapons against terrorists", 10 February 2018. Available at https://en.mehrnews.com/news/132045/Iran-s-Mohajer-6-Qaem-bomb-deadly-weapons-against-terrorists.

[13] See U.S. Central Command, "Coalition shoots down armed UAV in Syria", 20 June 2017. Available at http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/1219863/coalition-shoots-down-armed-uav-in-syria/.

related technical documents. The Permanent Representative noted in his letter that no Ukrainian individual or entity had engaged in an illegal activity or action inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). The letter further noted that that missile type had not been in use in Ukraine since 1991 and that all remaining component parts were stored under the proper control of its armed forces.

## B. Restrictions on arms-related transfers from the Islamic Republic of Iran

37. In paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council decided that all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the time of reporting, no proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph.

38. In a letter dated 24 May 2017, the Permanent Representative of Bahrain brought to the attention of the Secretariat information regarding multiple seizures of arms and related materiel in Bahrain after 16 January 2016 that, in its assessment, had been produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran and transferred in a manner inconsistent with paragraph 6 (b) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The authorities of Bahrain invited the Secretariat to examine those items in May 2018. The Secretariat observed that two assault rifles and ammunition rounds had characteristics of the Iranian-produced KL 7.62 x 39 mm assault rifles (featuring furnishing made of dark brown synthetic material, fire selector and rear sight markings, slanted screw-on compensator and dot-peen marking style) and 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition (featuring brass cartridge case and green primer annulus lacquer, and identifiable by the nature, position and format of the head stamp markings). The Secretariat also observed that three hand grenades, the packaging of C-4 explosive blocks, and electronic and electrical equipment that could be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices, were similar to those found in various arms shipments seized previously and assessed to have been shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the Secretariat is confident that some of the arms and related materiel it examined in May 2018 were manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it has found no indication of whether those items were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016. The Secretariat is still analysing other information collected and will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.

39. The Secretariat obtained additional information on the unmanned surface vessel laden with explosives recovered by the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates (see S/2017/1030, para. 34). In a letter dated 12 March 2018, the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates confirmed to the Secretariat that the vessel had been recovered on 19 September 2016, six miles east of the port of Assab, Eritrea (and not in Yemeni waters as previously indicated to the Secretariat). The Secretariat was provided with the opportunity to examine the vessel and to re-examine the guidance and detonation systems. In both the computer and the dome camera (both integral parts of the guidance system), the logo and/or name of an Iranian entity that produces terminals with characteristics similar to those found in the vessel were observed. The Secretariat confirmed that some of the previously presented photographs and geographical coordinates, including for locations in Tehran and in Iranian territorial waters, had originated from the recovered hard drive of the computer found in the unmanned surface vessel. However, the Secretariat could not confirm the actual dates on which they had been captured. The Secretariat has also received documentary evidence indicating that identical fuse plates and detonation device boosters seized in a separate incident had been shipped from the Islamic Republic of Iran (see S/2017/1030, para. 33). The Secretariat is confident that at least

parts of the detonation and guidance systems of the unmanned surface vessel had been manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, no indications have been found of whether those items were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.

40. In March 2018, the Secretariat was invited by the authorities of the United Arab Emirates to examine UAVs reportedly recovered in Yemen after 16 January 2016, which, in their assessment, were Iranian-made and had been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). One was a composite assembly of parts from various seizures. The other one had reportedly crashed in Mukha', Yemen, in February 2018. The Secretariat observed that those were identical to the one examined during the previous reporting period (see S/2017/1030, para. 35) and had the same design features as the Iranian-made Ababil-2 UAV (featuring a pusher propeller, high-mounted canards at the front and larger wings at the rear, each fitted with a vertical stabilization fin with a rudder).[14] They had similar serial number prefixes and were built using identical material, component and subcomponent parts. The Secretariat is still analysing the information collected on all three vehicles and will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.

41. In identical letters dated 10 and 23 May 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/443 and S/2018/495), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that rockets launched from the Syrian Arab Republic towards Israel on 10 May 2018 had been launched "by the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard" and constituted an "Iranian breach" of resolution 2231 (2015). In a letter dated 14 May 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/459), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran recalled the identical letters dated 10 May by the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic (S/2018/447), in which it had been indicated that the Syrian Army had exercised its right to self-defence, and stated that the claim by Israeli authorities of "military action by Iran from the Syrian territory against their military positions in the occupied Golan Heights is false and unfounded".

42. In identical letters dated 28 November 2017 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2017/1000), the Permanent Representative of Israel expressed concern at what he said was a statement by the Commander of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Major General Mohamed Ali Jafari, which he said expressed "Iran's intentions and actions taken to continue arming Hizbullah" in violation of Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2231 (2015). In response, in a letter dated 5 December 2017 addressed to me (S/2017/1019), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran accused Israel of making "false and baseless accusations".

43. In a televised interview broadcasted on 21 May 2018, the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had provided the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and other armed groups in Gaza with "money, [military] equipment and expertise" before and after the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict.[15] That statement suggests that transfers of arms and related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran may have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

44. It appears that Iranian entities continue to exhibit what appears to be arms and related materiel in foreign exhibitions. Information released by the organizers of the seventh International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, held in Baghdad from 10 to

[14] Catalogue of the Export Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Available at http://www.mindexcenter.ir/product/ababil-2-uav-system.

[15] Available at http://www.almayadeen.net/episodes/880421/حركة-حرنيس---السنوار-يحيى_خاص-حوار-غزة-في-حماس.

13 March 2018, indicates that several Iranian entities participated in the exhibition for the third year in a row. Items displayed by those entities during previous exhibitions appeared to include small arms, artillery ammunition, rockets, anti-tank guided missiles and man-portable air defence systems. Furthermore, information released by the organizers of the Eurasia Airshow 2018, held in Antalya, Turkey, from 25 to 29 April 2018, indicates that several Iranian entities participated in that exhibition. According to Iranian media outlets, the items exhibited included reconnaissance drones.[16] The Secretariat raised these issue with the Permanent Missions of Iraq and Turkey to the United Nations. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran had previously stated that it had believed that no prior approval had been required from the Security Council for that activity since the Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course as additional information becomes available.

## VI. Implementation of the assets freeze provisions

45. Pursuant to paragraphs 6 (c) and (d) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of the individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015)[17] and ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available to those individuals and entities.

46. It appears that an entity presently on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), the Defence Industries Organization, may have participated again in the International Defence Exhibition in Iraq, which was held in March 2018 (see para. 44 above). Its name is on the exhibitors list released by the organizers of the exhibition. Any of the entity's funds, other financial assets and economic resources on Iraqi territory, on or after the date of adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, should have been frozen by the Iraqi authorities. The issue has been raised again with the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations, and I will provide an update thereon to the Council in due course.

47. It also appears that another entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, signed a memorandum of understanding in 2017 with the Syrian Engineers Syndicate "for joint cooperation in building sector, services and developmental projects, training cadres, conducting researches and holding symposiums".[18] The Syrian authorities are to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the entity. The Secretariat has sought clarification from the

[16] Fars News Agency, "Iran displays 2 reconnaissance drones in Eurasia 2018 Airshow in Turkey", 25 April 2018. Available at http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13970205001259.

[17] Available at www.un.org/en/sc/2231/list.shtml. The list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) includes the individuals and entities specified on the list established under resolution 1737 (2006) and maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), as at the date of adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), with the exception of 36 individuals and entities specified in the attachment to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), who had been delisted on Implementation Day. The Council can delist individuals or entities, and list additional individuals and entities found to meet certain designation criteria defined by resolution 2231 (2015). There are currently 23 individuals and 61 entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015).

[18] Syrian Arab News Agency, "Syria, Iran to enhance cooperation on urban development", 26 September 2017. Available at https://sana.sy/en/?p=114661; and Financial Tribune, "Iran seeking role in Syria's power grid reconstruction", 7 November 2017. Available at https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/75756/iran-seeking-role-in-syrias-power-grid-reconstruction.

Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course.

## VII. Implementation of the travel ban provision

48. Pursuant to paragraph 6 (e) of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States are to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the individuals on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). At the time of reporting, no travel exemption requests had been received or granted by the Security Council in relation to individuals presently on the list.

49. Since the issuance of my previous report, additional information has surfaced regarding travel by Major General Soleimani. According to Iraqi media outlets, the General reportedly travelled to Baghdad in mid-May 2018. The Secretariat sought clarification from the Permanent Mission of Iraq.

## VIII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

50. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs has continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission established in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on all matters related to the procurement channel. In addition, the Division has provided induction briefings for the incoming Facilitator and members of the Security Council to assist them in their work on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

51. Through the Security Council website, the Division continued to promote the dissemination of publicly available information on the restrictions imposed by resolution 2231 (2015).[19] Relevant documents in all official languages were regularly added to and updated on the website. The Division also continued to use outreach opportunities to promote the dissemination of information on the resolution, in particular the procurement channel, in line with paragraph 6 (e) of the note by the President of the Council dated 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44). In February 2018, the Division participated in the Twenty-fifth Asian Export Control Seminar, held in Tokyo, and jointly organized by the Centre for Information on Security Trade Controls, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In April 2018, the Division also participated in an outreach event, organized by the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to United Nations organizations in Vienna and hosted by the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, on the margins of a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The interactions of the Division with representatives of Member States and private sector entities during those events showed that outreach activities remained important to increasing awareness and allaying misunderstandings with respect to provisions set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), including regarding the procurement channel, and the actors involved in the implementation of the resolution and their respective roles.

52. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the procedures for the submission of nuclear-related proposals and the review process.

[19] See http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/.

United Nations S/2018/603

# Security Council

Distr.: General
13 June 2018
English
Original: Russian

## Letter dated 23 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith an information bulletin dated 23 May 2018 from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

18-09747 (E) 140618 140618

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## Annex to the letter dated 23 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

## Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (23 May 2018)

### Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported four incidents of gunfire in Aleppo Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported one incident of gunfire in Idlib Governorate.

### Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out three humanitarian operations: one in Shaykhah, Hama Governorate; one in Sin, Aleppo Governorate; and one in Harasta, Rif Dimashq Governorate. In total, 1,335 food parcels were distributed. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered was 5.7 tons.

In total, 1,816 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,577.76 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 230 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 81,047 residents.

### Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,513.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

United Nations S/2018/604

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 June 2018

Original: English

## United States of America: draft resolution

*The Security Council*,

*Recalling* all its previous relevant resolutions on Iraq, in particular 1500 (2003), 1546 (2004), 1557 (2004), 1619 (2005), 1700 (2006), 1770 (2007), 1830 (2008), 1883 (2009), 1936 (2010), 2001 (2011), 2061 (2012), 2110 (2013), 2169 (2014), 2233 (2015), 2299 (2016), 2379 (2017), and *reiterating* resolution 2107 (2013) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, and the values set forth in 2367 (2017),

*Reaffirming* the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, and *emphasizing* the importance of the stability and security of Iraq for the people of Iraq, the region, and the international community, particularly in light of Iraq's victory over the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh),

*Supporting* Iraq in addressing the challenges it faces as it turns to the task of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, including the requirement to meet the needs of all Iraqis, including women, youth, children, displaced persons, and persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities,

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) until 31 May 2019;

2. *Decides* further that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMI, at the request of the Government of Iraq, and taking into account the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General (S/2018/430), shall

(a) prioritize the provision of advice, support, and assistance to the Government and people of Iraq on advancing inclusive, political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation;

(b) further advise, support, and assist:

(i) the Government of Iraq and the Independent High Electoral Commission on the development of processes for holding elections and referenda;

(ii) the Government of Iraq and the Council of Representatives on constitutional review, the implementation of constitutional provisions, as well as on the development of processes acceptable to the Government of Iraq to resolve disputed internal boundaries;

(iii) the Government of Iraq on facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation, including on issues of border security, energy, environment, water, and refugees;



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(iv) the Government of Iraq with progress on security sector reform efforts, on planning, funding and implementing reintegration programmes for former members of armed groups, where and as appropriate, in coordination with other multinational entities;

(c) promote, support, and facilitate, in coordination with the Government of Iraq:

(i) the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safe, orderly, and voluntary return, as appropriate, of refugees and displaced persons, including through the efforts of the UN Country Team;

(ii) the coordination and implementation of programmes to improve Iraq's capacity to provide effective civil, social and essential services for its people and continue active donor coordination of critical reconstruction and assistance programmes;

(iii) Iraqi, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other efforts on economic reform, capacity-building and setting conditions for sustainable development, including through coordination with national and regional organizations and, as appropriate, civil society, donors, and other international institutions;

(iv) the contributions of UN agencies, funds, and programmes to the objectives outlined in this resolution under the unified leadership of the Secretary-General through the Special Representative for Iraq, supported by their designated Deputy;

(d) promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform, in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq, in addition to supporting the work of the investigative team established in resolution 2379 (2017);

(e) approach gender mainstreaming as a crosscutting issue throughout its mandate and to advise and assist the Government of Iraq in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels;

(f) and assist Government of Iraq and United Nations Country Team efforts to strengthen child protection, including the rehabilitation and reintegration of children;

3. *Recognizes* that security of United Nations personnel is essential for UNAMI to carry out its work for the benefit of the people of Iraq and *calls upon* the Government of Iraq to continue to provide security and logistical support to the United Nations presence in Iraq;

4. *Expresses* its intention to review the mandate of UNAMI by 31 May 2019 or sooner, if requested by the Government of Iraq;

5. *Welcomes* the results of the independent external assessment of UNAMI as requested by resolution 2367 (2017), its findings, and its recommendations, and *encourages* UNAMI, the Secretariat and UN agencies, offices, funds and programs to implement those recommendations;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council every three months on the progress made towards the fulfilment of all UNAMI's responsibilities, including actions taken in response to the independent external assessment;

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2018/605

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 June 2018
English
Original: Arabic

**Identical letters dated 12 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

On Sunday, 11 June 2018, warplanes of the illegitimate international coalition led by the United States of America committed a new crime against innocent civilians in an Iraqi refugee camp in Syria. They deliberately bombed a school in the village of Khuwaybirah south-east of Shaddadah in Hasakah governorate. The result was a massacre that took the lives of 18 civilians, mostly Iraqi women and children living in the camp. On Tuesday, 12 June 2018, that illegitimate coalition bombed the homes of innocent civilians in the village of Tall al-Shayir in the south-eastern Hasakah countryside, resulting in the murder of 12 civilians from the same family.

The true criminal face of that coalition has become grotesquely plain for all the peoples of the world to see. All the veils have been lifted that were being used to conceal the air attacks being launched without justification against innocent civilian refugee women and children who have fled the terrorism of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) only to face the harshness and brutality of United States airplanes.

The coalition continues to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity against the Syrian people. It continues to support terrorism and use terrorists and separatist militias to achieve its goals. In the meantime, the United Nations and the Security Council have failed to take any action to implement international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and put an end to the activities of that coalition and its hostile schemes to target the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic in order to prolong the crisis there.

The Syrian Arab Republic once again calls on the Security Council to shoulder its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, to condemn these massacres, and to take immediate action to stop them and prevent their recurrence. It must put an end to the hostile and illegal presence on Syrian territory of United States forces and other foreign forces, and prevent them from implementing their schemes to support terrorism, undermine the security and stability of the Syrian Arab Republic, and prolong the crisis there. The statements being made before the Security Council by the United States delegation and the delegations of other members of this despicable alliance about the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the rights of refugees, respect for international humanitarian law and respect for the territorial integrity of Syria and its people have for the umpteenth time been revealed to be no more than empty words that are belied by those States' actions on the ground. We defy them to prove the contrary.



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I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2018/606

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 June 2018

Original: English

**Letter dated 13 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

Please find attached herewith a summary of the statement by the Government of the Republic of Yemen issued on 12 June 2018 concerning the military situation in Hudaydah province (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Marwan **Al-Dobhany**
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.

18-10032 (E) 210618

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## Annex to the letter dated 13 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

## Statement of 12 June 2018 by the Government of the Republic of Yemen on liberating Hudaydah (summary)

The Government of the Republic of Yemen reaffirms its commitment to continue the liberation of all areas in Yemen from the grips of the Houthi militia.

The Government reiterates what President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi has stated: that it has for a long time been seeking a peaceful solution based on the three references for peace (the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, the outcomes of the national dialogue conference and Security Council resolution 2216 (2015)) and has made many concessions to avoid a military solution; and that it cannot allow the continued exploitations of the suffering of the Yemeni people by the Houthis to prolong the conflict.

The Government further reiterates that, due to the continuation of the Houthis' practices, which exacerbate further the dire humanitarian situation in Hudaydah, and due to their continued spoiling of any attempts to reach a political solution to the Yemeni conflict, President Hadi has called on the National Army and the popular resistance supported by the Arab Coalition to liberate militarily the city and port of Hudaydah from the Houthis.

The Government further confirms that it has exhausted all peaceful and political means to remove the Houthis from Hudaydah and called, more than once, for the assistance of the international community to alleviate the dire humanitarian situation facing all Yemenis — and Hudaydah residents in particular — as a result of the Houthis' continued abuse of the port of Hudaydah and use of the port to smuggle Iranian weapons.

The Government regards the liberation of Hudaydah as a milestone on the path of restoring Yemen from the grip of the Houthis, which will mark the beginning of the Houthis' fall, secure navigation in the Bab al-Mandab strait and put an end to the Iranian intrusion.

The Government confirms that after liberating Hudaydah it will, with the support of the Arab Coalition, carry out its national duties towards its citizens by alleviating their suffering and restoring normal life to all districts of Hudaydah.

United Nations S/2018/607

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 June 2018

Original: English

**Letter dated 13 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 13 June 2018 from Cabinet member and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, Anwar Mohammed Gargash, regarding recent developments in Hudaydah, Yemen (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Lana **Nusseibeh**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-09844 (E) 190618

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## Annex to the letter dated 13 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The United Arab Emirates has deployed forces in Yemen since 2015 at the request of the legitimate Government of Yemen to protect Yemen and its people from the continuing aggression by the Houthis, as part of a multi-member Arab coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The Security Council was duly informed of that request in a letter dated 24 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations and in identical letters dated 26 March 2015 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2015/217), as noted in the preamble to Security Council resolution 2216 (2015).

As a member of the coalition, the principal objective of the United Arab Emirates has always been, and continues to be, restoring the sovereignty of the legitimate and internationally recognized Government of Yemen, and bringing an end to the conflict in Yemen which the Houthis began. The coalition is acting in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council and its implementation mechanism, and the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference.

On 14 April 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2216 (2015), in which it made a series of demands to the Houthis, to be implemented immediately and unconditionally, including ending the use of violence, withdrawing their forces from all areas they had seized, relinquishing all additional arms seized from military and security institutions, ceasing all actions that were exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen, refraining from any provocation or threats to neighbouring States, ending the recruitment and use of children, and releasing all children from their ranks. To date, the Houthis have not implemented those demands, in clear violation of resolution 2216 (2015).

Leaving the Houthi militia in control of large areas of northern Yemen while they continue to perpetrate lethal ballistic missile attacks on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would not only leave resolution 2216 (2015) unfulfilled, it would also compromise the national security of the United Arab Emirates and other States in our region. In this regard, we reaffirm our legitimate right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law.

As Security Council members are well aware, the United Arab Emirates has always sought a negotiated resolution to this conflict. Our military operations have been conducted to that end. However, efforts to find a political solution have been stalled for nearly two years by Houthi intransigence, to the detriment of the Yemeni population. Further prolonging the present situation would only increase the suffering of the Yemeni people.

The legitimate Government of Yemen and the coalition have come to the conclusion that depriving the Houthi militia of its control over the port of Hudaydah is the most effective way to bring the Houthis to the negotiating table and end the conflict. We believe that this is militarily possible and that it can be achieved with minimal impact on Yemeni civilians, whose safety is of utmost concern. The Yemeni Government is fully in support of this operation, and has requested local Yemeni forces to play a leading role in it. The United Arab Emirates affirms its commitment to complying with international humanitarian law and to implementing the principles of precaution, proportionality and discrimination in the conduct of its operations.

The coalition has delayed this operation for over a year, in response to concerns voiced by the United Nations and relief agencies. During that time, Hudaydah has continued to be the principal gateway used by the Houthi militia for the illegal smuggling of Iranian weaponry, in flagrant violation of resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015), including the sophisticated Iranian missiles and drones used against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia in recent months. In this regard, the United Arab Emirates notes that the final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (S/2018/68) found Iran to be in non-compliance with the arms embargo established by paragraph 14 of resolution 2216 (2015) by failing to take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and equipment to the Houthi militias. It has unfortunately become clear that the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen has not been effective in preventing this continued flow of weaponry.

In addition, the United Arab Emirates remains gravely concerned by the grossly negligent operation of the port under the Houthis' control and by its humanitarian impact. The Houthis have demonstrated that they have no regard for the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence: they have regularly confiscated the coalition's aid shipments and corruptly mismanaged the port in a way that has had a catastrophic impact on the humanitarian situation in Yemen. The Houthis have repeatedly rejected proposals for the port to be placed under United Nations control, including the most recent push by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Martin Griffiths. Ending Houthi control of the port city and restoring the legitimate Government's control will be welcomed by its inhabitants and will improve its capacity to deliver much-needed supplies to inland areas of northern Yemen.

All peaceful means to address the serious humanitarian consequences of the Houthi control of the port of Hudaydah have been exhausted. Most recently, the coalition agreed to a 48-hour postponement of military operations in Hudaydah to provide Mr. Griffiths with additional time to negotiate the peaceful withdrawal of the Houthis. Regrettably, and notwithstanding the Special Envoy's commendable efforts, the coalition's conditions — requiring the Houthis to withdraw from Hudaydah completely, hand over control to the legitimate Government of Yemen and cooperate in the demining efforts — were rejected.

The Arab coalition has concluded that the time has come to liberate the port of Hudaydah from Houthi control. The United Arab Emirates cares deeply about the welfare of the Yemeni people and has contributed nearly $4 billion in assistance to Yemen in the past three years. The United Arab Emirates is committed to ensuring the continued flow of food and vital supplies to the wider Yemeni population, both in Hudaydah and the areas that it supplies. Our military action aims to minimize any negative impact on the working of the port itself. The United Arab Emirates will exercise utmost caution so as to avoid any physical damage to the port. The United Arab Emirates hopes that the Security Council will receive the same assurance from the Houthi side for the well-being of the people of Yemen.

Furthermore, consistent with the long-standing commitment of the United Arab Emirates to the legitimate Government of Yemen and the Yemeni people, I would like to inform you that the United Arab Emirates has developed, over the past year, a comprehensive plan for a large-scale humanitarian operation to ensure the continued flow of essential supplies and shelter to the civilian population under a range of scenarios. Key immediate features of this plan include:

- Measures to ensure the rapid delivery of enough food within the first week to sustain 600,000 people for a month. This intensified flow of aid will continue until the port has been restored, which the United Arab Emirates anticipates will take place within two weeks of the operation commencing.

- The deployment of port and logistics experts to address any damage to the port infrastructure perpetrated by the Houthis.
- Minesweeping operations to open a safe channel to the port once it is secured.
- The restoration of operations at Hudaydah airport and alternative means to deliver aid to Hudaydah and beyond.
- Close coordination with United Nations and other international humanitarian agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations operating on the ground.

Further details of this plan, including contingencies and countrywide coverage, will be provided shortly by our Minister of State for International Cooperation, Reem Al Hashimy.

The United Arab Emirates will continue to work closely with the Special Envoy to achieve the peaceful negotiated solution that we all seek. It is the United Arab Emirates' firm belief that this operation will bring that solution closer, and with it a return to constitutional rule in Yemen and an end to its people's suffering.

(*Signed*) Anwar **Gargash**
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs



18-09844

United Nations A/72/899–S/2018/608

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Security Council

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**General Assembly**
**Seventy-second session**
Agenda item 44
**Question of Cyprus**

**Security Council**
**Seventy-third year**

## Letter dated 14 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith two documents detailing the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships (see annex II) during the month of April 2018.

I also wish to inform you that the occupation regime illegally issued three notices to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force in April 2018.

It should be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tympou. Additionally, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region via radio calls. Meanwhile, infringements of the Nicosia flight information region and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

The said actions of Turkey, which has illegally occupied the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus since 1974, are clearly aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In this respect, I would like to underline, once again, that there is only one legal authority in Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus, as stipulated in various Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), in which the Council declared the establishment of the so-called "TRNC" as null and void.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest against the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

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Finally, I would like to urge Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to heed the calls of the international community and contribute to a meaningful resumption of the peace process, instead of focusing on undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kornelios **Korneliou**

## Annex I to the letter dated 14 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

### Air violations

| *Date* | *Time* | *Nature of violation* |
|---|---|---|
| 2 April | 1033–1225 | One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC) |
| | 1300–1330 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1738–2030 | One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 3 April | 0919–1256 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1331–1436 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 4 April | 0915–1408 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1029–1050 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1552–1710 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |

| *Date* | *Time* | *Nature of violation* |
|---|---|---|
| | 1924–1933 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 5 April | 0921–1221 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1045–1303 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1452–1512 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 7 April | 1032–1133 | One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1145–1205 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1355–1409 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 8 April | 1508–1545 | One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 9 April | 0910–1007 | One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 10 April | 1038–1208 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |

| *Date* | *Time* | *Nature of violation* |
|---|---|---|
| | 1431–1620 | One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 12 April | 1015–1604 | One AS-532 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1355–1436 | One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 13 April | 1008–1154 | One Huey Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 15 April | 0930–0950 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1050–1107 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 16 April | 1045–1120 | One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1443–1615 | One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1446–1450 | Four F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1545–1629 | One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |

| *Date* | *Time* | *Nature of violation* |
|---|---|---|
| 17 April | 1333–1519 | Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1354–1538 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1408–1517 | Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1640–1710 | One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 18 April | 1043–1407 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1509–1620 | One UH-1 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 2059–2204 | One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 19 April | 1037–1204 | One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1043–1200 | One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1202–1220 | One ATR-72 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1225–1252 | One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1540–1554 | One ATR-72 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |

| *Date* | *Time* | *Nature of violation* |
|---|---|---|
| 20 April | 1015–1200 | One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1132–1300 | One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1206–1214 | One GLF Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1525–1545 | One GLF Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 21 April | 1301–1314 | One GLF Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 23 April | 1818–1828 | One GLF Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 24 April | 1257–1423 | One Huey Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 25 April | 1109–1133 | One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1523–1638 | One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1605–1622 | One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |

| *Date* | *Time* | *Nature of violation* |
|---|---|---|
| 26 April | 1007–1128 | One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1143–1310 | One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1330–1358 | One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1531–1602 | One ATR-72 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1629–1645 | One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 27 April | 1227–1434 | One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 2023–2040 | One ATR-72 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 28 April | 1100–1144 | One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1610–1830 | One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 29 April | 1310–1333 | One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |

| *Date* | *Time* | *Nature of violation* |
|---|---|---|
| | 1626–1649 | One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 2254–2347 | Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| 30 April | 0847–0948 | One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |
| | 1329–1446 | One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC |

## Annex II to the letter dated 14 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

### Naval violations

| *Dates* | *Nature of violation* |
|---|---|
| 1–2 April | One F-244 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 3–5 April | One Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 5–7 April | One Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 5–10 April | One F-244 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 5–12 April | One A-595 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 8–9 April | One Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 9–14 April | One Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 10–12 April | One F-501 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 10–12 April | One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 12 April | One F-244 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 12–14 April | One F-246 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 12–15 April | One A-595 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |

| *Dates* | *Nature of violation* |
|---|---|
| 14–15 April | One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 15–17 April | One A-595 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 15–17 April | One F-246 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 15–20 April | One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 16–17 April | One NL-123 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 19 April | One NL-123 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 19–22 April | One F-244 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 19–25 April | One A-595 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 22–28 April | One S-355 Turkish submarine violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 24–27 April | One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 25 April | One A-595 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 25 April | One F-244 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |
| 28–29 April | One P-349 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces |

United Nations S/2018/609

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# Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 17 February to 3 June 2018)

## I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2406 (2018), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until 15 March 2019, and in accordance with prior resolutions in which the Council requested me to report on the implementation of the mandate every 90 days. It covers political and security developments from 17 February to 3 June 2018, the humanitarian situation and progress in the implementation of the Mission mandate.

## II. Political and economic developments

2. During the reporting period, efforts to revitalize the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan continued, while the national dialogue proceeded with its consultations and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) moved forward with its reunification process, although both suffered from a lack of inclusivity.

### Peace process

3. Following the adjournment of the second session of the high-level revitalization forum of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on 16 February, IGAD utilized the subsequent three-month period in the lead-up to the resumption of the forum on 17 May to engage the parties in shuttle diplomacy in order to provide impetus to the peace process and bridge their divergent positions on governance and security issues. In this respect, the IGAD Council of Ministers and the IGAD Special Envoy held consultations with the Transitional Government of National Unity in Juba, the former First Vice-President, Riek Machar, in Pretoria and with other parties and entities in Addis Ababa.

4. During a briefing to the Transitional National Legislative Assembly in Juba on 5 March, the Government indicated that, in the event of a failure to reach an agreement, it would consider exercising its "sovereign decision" and extend the transitional period. In tandem, on 1 March, the nine opposition groups participating in the forum announced the formation of the South Sudan Opposition Alliance and, on 27 March, with the SPLM "Former Detainees", further requested to be consulted as one entity during the IGAD consultations.



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5. On 26 March, the IGAD Council of Ministers issued a communiqué in which it decided to adopt targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for violations of the cessation of hostilities agreement, and referred to the African Union Peace and Security Council for appropriate punitive measures. IGAD also recommended that Riek Machar be allowed to move from South Africa to another country not bordering South Sudan. On 26 March, the pro-Machar Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Opposition submitted an open letter to the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed Ali, in which it requested the unconditional release of Riek Machar and his participation in the revitalization forum.

6. Shortly thereafter, a delegation from the Peace and Security Council of the African Union visited South Sudan, from 15 to 19 April. On 26 April, in a communiqué, the Council called on the South Sudanese parties to participate in the forum in good faith and make the necessary compromises to achieve peace and security. The Council also endeavoured to utilize the various tools and mechanisms to ensure the commitment of the parties by requesting the African Union Commission, in consultation with IGAD, to develop and submit proposals on punitive measures which could be applied against all those who continue to obstruct efforts towards the restoration of peace and security in South Sudan.

7. On 30 April, prior to the forum, the Ministry of Justice presented to Parliament a draft constitutional amendment bill, which provided for the incorporation of the Agreement into the 2011 Transitional Constitution of South Sudan. Concurrently, on 3 and 4 May, the ruling SPLM held a two-day meeting of its National Liberation Council, the opening day of which was attended by the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt. The meeting was not attended by the pro-Machar SPLM in Opposition or the SPLM "Former Detainees" outside the country. The meeting concluded with a resolution endorsing a revised implementation plan for SPLM reunification and calling on reinstated party officials to attend the next meeting of the council, which it was proposed be held within 45 days. The First Vice-President, Taban Deng Gai, also announced, in a press release on 7 May, the formal dissolution of his faction and its reintegration into SPLM.

8. Following further shuttle diplomacy and proximity talks on 11 and 12 May, the revitalization forum was held in Addis Ababa from 17 to 23 May, as a continuation of its second phase. The South Sudan Council of Churches facilitated sessions of intra-South Sudanese dialogue to help the parties to bridge their differences on the 10 outstanding governance and security issues identified as critical to revitalize the Agreement. In a signed statement drafted by the Council of Churches on 21 May, the parties recommitted to the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement and agreed to implement a quota of 35 per cent for the participation of women at all levels of government and to continue the consultations on governance and security issues. However, in view of the lack of substantial progress in reaching a compromise by the parties, IGAD introduced bridging proposals on 21 May on the outstanding issues. On 22 May, the parties submitted their reactions to the IGAD bridging proposals, maintaining their entrenched and divergent positions, in particular on responsibility-sharing, the structure and composition of states, the number and allocations of seats in the legislature and on transitional security arrangements.

9. On 31 May, the IGAD Council of Ministers convened an extraordinary session, at which it considered progress made and outlined the way forward in the IGAD-led peace process. The Council recommended that IGAD consider convening an extraordinary summit and a face-to-face meeting between the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar on the margins of the African Union Summit in early July, authorized one more round of consultations with the parties to build consensus on the bridging proposals and directed the IGAD facilitation team to develop a full revitalized text of the Agreement. The Council also decided to submit

punitive measures against violators of the cessation of hostilities agreement for approval of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government. On the same day, the Security Council decided to extend the South Sudan sanctions regime pending a review of the parties' adherence to the cessation of hostilities agreement and progress towards a viable political settlement by 30 June (see Council resolution 2418 (2018)).

**Other national political developments**

10. The subnational "grassroots" consultations phase on the national dialogue concluded. In March, a subcommittee travelled to Ethiopia and the Sudan to consult South Sudanese refugees and diaspora. During April and early May, the national dialogue steering committee held plenary meetings in Juba to review subcommittee reports about the consultations. As indicated in the subcommittee reports, and observed by UNMISS, the grassroots consultations gathered a wide range of views from the public about the causes of conflict in South Sudan and the possible solutions. Nonetheless, consultations were affected by shortcomings in geographic coverage and participation and some concerns about security. On 15 March, in a media interview, the co-chair of the Dialogue, Angelo Beda, acknowledged the opposition's boycott of the dialogue and the challenge that it posed. By late May, the steering committee had approved and adopted all 15 subcommittee reports. The steering committee announced a two-month recess until mid-August in order to prepare for the planned regional conferences.

11. During the reporting period, a number of senior government and public appointments were announced. On 12 March, President Kiir appointed Salvatore Garang Mabiordit as Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. On 2 May, President Kiir appointed General Gabriel Jok Riak as Chief of Defence Forces of SPLA, succeeding General James Ajongo, who died on 20 April. Jok Riak is among the individuals on the sanctions list pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) and is also the subject of targeted sanctions by the European Union and the United States.

**Economic developments**

12. The performance of the economy remained poor during the reporting period. Currency depreciation was rapid and accompanied by high inflation. Consumer price inflation in the year to March was measured at 161 per cent. Although the Central Bank maintained a fixed official rate of around 137 South Sudanese pounds to the United States dollar, the currency depreciated on the market from around 230 pounds per dollar in February to 300 pounds per dollar in May. Oil production, at around 120,000 to 130,000 barrels per day, remains consistent with the average over the past four years. Despite buoyant international oil prices, overall fiscal performance did not improve, raising concerns about the management of the additional oil revenue. Public sector workers continue to face prolonged delays in receiving salaries, in some cases reportedly extending to five months, and levels of spending on public services and infrastructure remain very low.

13. On 21 March, the United States Department of Commerce announced that it was adding to its entity list the names of 15 entities involved in the South Sudan oil sector. The listing imposes additional licensing requirements for United States exports, re-exports or transfers to the companies listed.

## III. Security situation

14. During the reporting period, conflict intensified in parts of Unity and Central Equatoria, with evidence of government and aligned forces seeking to dislodge opposition forces ahead of the rainy season.

### Greater Upper Nile region

15. The security situation in the greater Upper Nile region remained volatile, with fighting reported between Government alongside aligned forces and pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition. In Unity, clashes occurred primarily in central and southern parts, with fighting reported on 17 February in Buaw, Koch County, and from mid-April in the greater Koch area, and in Rubkona and Guit counties. Thereafter, SPLA and aligned forces reportedly carried out significant attacks in Mayendit and Leer counties from 21 to 29 April, including fighting that reached the opposition position at Thonyor and surrounding villages near Leer town. As fighting continued to move south, on 1 May, armed youth reported to be under the command of a government official and supported by two SPLA tanks shelled the swampy areas south-east of the Adok port from Meer village and looted cattle, killed an unknown number of civilians and committed human rights violations. Fighting between the warring parties resumed throughout the first week of May, with reports that SPLA forces attacked opposition positions in Rubkway, Mayendit County, and Mirmir, Koch County. On 10 May, youth from Bieh, Koch County, allegedly armed by SPLA forces, reportedly attacked Rubkway, Thaker, and Dablual in Mayendit County. Meanwhile, the situation throughout Leer County further deteriorated on 11 May, with reports of fighting in Thonyor, Touch Riak, Kok, Pilling, Meer, Adok and Yang.

16. In Jonglei, Government and pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition forces reportedly clashed in the greater Wa'at and Akobo areas. On 1 April, Government forces allegedly attacked the opposition in Yuai, resulting in the deaths of four civilians and a number of soldiers on both sides. On 18 and 19 April, clashes occurred in Motot, Pieri, Wa'at and Pulchuol; the opposition subsequently claimed that Government forces had captured Motot and Pieri and killed four civilians, reportedly including an infant, burned tukuls and looted supplies. Five SPLA soldiers were also reportedly killed and significant civilian displacement from Nyerol and Uror was reported. Clashes resumed on 21 April in Motot, Paia and Pieri, with three civilians allegedly killed.

17. In Upper Nile, Government forces and pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition reportedly clashed in the Dhording Nasir and Kodok areas. On 12 and 25 March, pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition allegedly clashed with pro-Taban Deng Gai SPLA in Opposition in Kalaganj and, on 25 March, SPLA and pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition reportedly clashed in Kek, Manyo County. On 21 March, the pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition Commander confirmed that they had attacked SPLA in Nasir but withdrew under heavy fire south of the Sobat River, followed by clashes on 25 March at Dhording and Wichtut, in the immediate vicinity of the SPLA base in Nasir, and on 31 March in Nyatot and Kedbek, east of Nasir. On 1 April, SPLA allegedly attacked an opposition position in Atar, Canal (Khorfulus). Reports of fighting continued in May, with Government and opposition forces reportedly clashing on 5, 14 and 16 May in Pagak and on 17 May in Midiri.

### Greater Equatoria region

18. The situation in greater Equatoria remained tense, with reports of clashes between SPLA and pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition. On 26 February, the two warring parties reportedly clashed in Minyori, Yei area, resulting in the killing of an

opposition commander. Further clashes were reported on 7 March in Mitika, Lasu, and in Kili, Mukaya County, where opposition forces reportedly looted and burned down houses. Clashes in Morobo, on 15 March, allegedly resulted in the killing of one SPLA soldier. On 25 and 26 March and reportedly until 1 April, fighting broke out in the Kajo Kaji area over the recapturing of Morsak and Sokare.

19. In Eastern Equatoria, ambushes and robberies continued along the Juba-Torit-Kapoeta road. The government of Torit dispatched organized forces on 20 March to secure the road. In Western Equatoria, armed groups continued to be observed along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Additionally, clashes were reported between armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a group of armed Mbororo cattle keepers on 24 March, which allegedly resulted in the killing of one Congolese soldier. On 20 April, Government forces from Maridi reportedly clashed with the opposition in Mapoi, south-east of Tambura town, allegedly resulting in the deaths of 11 soldiers from both sides.

**Greater Bahr el-Ghazal region**

20. In Western Bahr el-Ghazal, the situation remained tense, with reports of clashes and civilian displacement. On 26 February, during a visit to Bagari, 29 national staff members of two international non-governmental organizations and one staff member of a local non-governmental organization were detained and released the following day by the pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition on the pretext that it had not received prior notification of the visit. The security situation reportedly further deteriorated as opposition forces clashed with the joint forces of SPLA and the Justice and Equality Movement in the Sopo and Deim Zubeir areas on 5 April, resulting in civilian displacement. On 12 and 13 May, SPLA forces attacked the opposition base in Dulu, approximately 35 kilometres south-west of Raja, resulting in four fatalities among opposition members, including a senior opposition commander.

**Intercommunal conflict**

21. Intercommunal violence continued in Warrap, Lakes, Unity and Jonglei, while in the Lakes, Gok and Western Lakes areas, civilian disarmament coincided with a decrease in communal conflict, notably between the Rup and Kuei Dinka sections. While some attributed the decrease to armed civilians retreating deeper into rural areas to avoid the disarmament, others warned that failure to disarm communities would create opportunities for armed actors to conduct cattle raids and attacks.

22. In several parts of Lakes, such as Long-Ameth, Panawac Boma and Rumbek East, the Government's disarmament force reportedly clashed with youth refusing to disarm on 22 March, resulting in the death of one member of the disarmament force and subsequent retaliation, in which residents were allegedly beaten, tukuls burned, a number of youth arrested and one youth killed. Similar tensions were in Pacong and in Awerial counties. In another development, from 23 to 26 March, the disarmament force reportedly attacked Mayom Paayam, Malek County and Manyiel cattle camp, near Rumbek town, in an attempt to relocate the Pakam section of the Dinka Agar from the land historically owned by the Ruop section of the Dinka Agar.

23. On 23 March, UNMISS observed the escalation of tensions following the mobilization of armed youth of the Dinka Gok Panyar section in Tiaptiap, north of Rumbek town. In Warrap, in Tonj, intercommunal conflict continued between the Thiik and Jalwau communities in Ngap-Agok and Wun Lit, and among clans in Wanh Alel County, on 23 and 24 February, reportedly resulting in the deaths of 10 Thiik and 10 Jalwau members, with a further 40 injured. On 4 March, renewed clashes reported between the Agar community and the Kongor section of the Jalwau in Tonj East led to 22 deaths. Bul Nuer from Mayom attacked the Luo from Tonj on the border in

April, resulting in 15 deaths and triggering reprisal attacks, and tensions between the Bul Nuer and the Misseriya pastoralists also remained high from February to April, but subsided following the withdrawal of the Misseriya back to the Sudan with the onset of the rainy season. In Jonglei, on 19 February, two Lou Nuer communities reportedly clashed in Akobo and four people were killed, while the Murle Lango and Kurenen age sets fought in Monchak and Likuangole, and later in Kelero on 25 February, resulting in several casualties and injuries.

## IV. Humanitarian situation

24. Indicators of the humanitarian situation in South Sudan paint a bleak picture. Refugee registration figures and estimates for internal displacement indicate that a total of around 4.2 million people (one in three South Sudanese) have been displaced by conflict since 2013. Of these, some 2.5 million (the majority women and children) are living in neighbouring countries, while 1.8 million are internally displaced.

25. The conflict has limited the population's safe access to arable land, disrupted livelihoods and left significant segments of the population highly dependent on humanitarian assistance, all contributing to high food levels of insecurity. Latest analysis estimates that, in the absence of sustained assistance and access, around 7.1 million people in the country could become severely food insecure in the coming months. Aid organizations forecast that, in 2018, around 1.1 million children under the age of five will suffer from malnourishment, with nearly 300,000 suffering severe malnutrition, at a heightened risk of death. The period of greatest risk will be the lean season, between May and July.

26. South Sudan remains one of the world's most challenging places to deliver humanitarian assistance. Harassment, detention, injury, kidnappings and the killing of aid workers have continued, despite the parties' expressed commitment in the December 2017 cessation of hostilities agreement to uphold international humanitarian law. Six aid workers were killed between February and mid-May. In February, two aid workers were killed in Koch County, Unity, during fighting. In April, there were an additional three fatalities among aid workers, following renewed fighting in multiple locations in Unity. One aid worker was killed by armed men while in a clearly marked non-governmental organization vehicle, undertaking humanitarian activities. Another was shot and killed while fleeing from crossfire during intercommunal clashes outside a non-governmental organization health facility; and another was shot and killed while returning to check on a health clinic that had been looted. In May, a staff member of a local non-governmental organization was caught in crossfire while working at a health clinic. These losses brought the total number of aid workers killed since the current conflict began in December 2013 to 101.

27. The reporting period also saw an increase in incidents in which opposition armed forces and groups detained aid workers. In March, SPLA in Opposition forces in Morobo County, Central Equatoria, detained seven national non-governmental organization aid workers for 20 days. On 25 April, a humanitarian convoy in Yei, Central Equatoria, was interrupted by SPLA in Opposition forces, and 10 South Sudanese aid workers employed by the United Nations and non-governmental organizations were detained for five days before being released. On 14 May, eight non-governmental organization workers were detained by SPLA in Opposition forces in the vicinity of Yangiri, Western Equatoria, and released four days later.

28. During the reporting period, aid operations were variously hindered and disrupted by bureaucratic interference by authorities, ad hoc requests for fees and accreditation requirements, illegal taxation, extortion, threats, intimidation and

harassment of aid workers. In February, 110 humanitarian access incidents were reported, 40 of which involved violence against humanitarian personnel. In March, 70 humanitarian access incidents were reported, 42 of which involved violence against aid workers or assets. In April, the figures were 80 and 32, respectively. Of such incidents in February, March and April, 47 per cent, 39 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively, were attributed to State security forces and services. In April and May, fighting in Unity caused the temporary relocation of more than 50 aid workers, disrupting the delivery of lifesaving services to tens of thousands of people.

29. Despite the difficulties and risks, humanitarian organizations continued to deliver life-saving assistance and protection. By the end of March, humanitarian organizations in South Sudan had provided assistance to nearly 3 million people of the 6 million targeted in 2018. They included 2.8 million people who received food assistance; more than 600,000 who were provided with access to clean water; some 100,000 people assisted with vital non-food items; nearly 230,000 children and women provided with emergency nutritional assistance; some 390,000 children supported with access to education; more than 510,000 people who received health care services and 463,985 children vaccinated against measles; and more than 500,000 people who received specialized protection services.

30. As at 31 May, the 2018 humanitarian response plan had received some $406.2 million against the $1.72 billion sought under the plan.

## V. Implementation of the Mission's mandated tasks

31. From 16 to 19 April 2018, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Bintou Keita, travelled to South Sudan to discuss the modalities for the implementation of the recommendations from the independent review of UNMISS conducted from November 2017 to January 2018 (see S/2018/143) and of the new UNMISS mandate with government officials, civil society representatives and the senior leadership of the Mission and the country team. During her visit, she met with the First Vice-President and cabinet ministers and called upon the Government to cooperate with the Mission, honour its commitment to implement the cessation of hostilities agreement, participate constructively in the revitalization forum and ensure that local reconciliation initiatives, including the national dialogue process, were complementary platforms to the efforts of IGAD. On 18 April, Ms. Keita also participated in a senior leadership dialogue with the Government and other national and international partners to strengthen and scale up interventions to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual- and gender-based violence. She subsequently visited Ethiopia, where she met with the senior leadership of the SPLM/A in Opposition and discussed with IGAD leaders United Nations support for the peace process.

### A. Protection of civilians

32. In line with the mandate, UNMISS has been working with United Nations country team partners to align protection activities under a system-wide approach. At present, UNMISS follows a three-tiered approach to the protection of civilians. Under the first tier, protection through dialogue and political engagement, through the good offices of my Special Representative, the Mission engaged national authorities and stakeholders. Through those engagements, the Mission re-emphasized the primary responsibility of the South Sudanese authorities to protect civilians and sought the collaboration of the latter and other partners to implement activities to protect civilians. Following an escalation in violence in southern Unity, on 1 May my Special

Representative travelled to Leer town and Dablual, Mayendit County, to meet with the warring parties, urging both sides to show restraint and uphold their responsibility to protect civilians from armed conflict. The Mission delivered 27 workshops at the subnational level, on social cohesion, reconciliation and conflict management, with 5,710 participants (1,796 women), including from UNMISS protection sites.

33. Under the second tier, protection from physical violence, as at 31 May, the Mission was protecting 203,723 internally displaced persons at five UNMISS protection of civilians sites. This included 116,725 in Bentiu, 39,405 in Juba, 24, 417 in Malakal, 2,296 in Bor and 20,880 in Wau. A temporary protection area in Leer, Unity, provided refuge to 2,000 displaced persons.

34. A total of 791 crimes and security incidents were recorded at the sites during the reporting period, with the highest incidence reported in Bentiu (367), followed by Juba (171), Wau (140), Malakal (84) and Bor (29). The most common security incidents recorded were assault (152), followed by fighting (81) and theft (79). UNMISS conducted 115 search operations at protection sites, resulting in the confiscation of prohibited items such as weapons, ammunition, illicit drugs and stolen United Nations property. To reinforce the civilian character of the sites, UNMISS continued regular meetings with community representatives at the Juba, Wau, Malakal and Bentiu sites to improve co-existence, security and safety. UNMISS developed a standard operating procedure for screening new arrivals at the sites. The Mission also promulgated guidelines on the detention of persons posing a security threat at or to the sites. A total of 126 persons suspected of being responsible for serious security incidents at the sites were detained in the UNMISS holding facilities in Bentiu, Juba and Malakal during the period from 17 February to 31 May 2018.

35. UNMISS established a framework to improve coordination and information-sharing with national authorities, including a protocol for responding to requests for cooperation in the identification and apprehension of suspected fugitives believed to be residing at protection sites. To promote accountability, UNMISS developed a pilot project for the referral, for national investigation and prosecution, of serious cases of crimes committed at the protection sites. In the initial phase of the pilot project, the Directorate of Public Prosecution accepted six cases for investigation of alleged sexual violence at the Malakal and Bentiu sites. Additional cases are under review by the Directorate. UNMISS is working with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and stakeholders towards the establishment of a specialized unit of national police, prosecutors and judges to focus on conflict-related crimes against women and children, including sexual and gender-based violence.

36. UNMISS continued to focus on deterring and mitigating violence against civilians beyond its protection sites. During the reporting period, a total of 12,025 patrols (short and long duration, dynamic air, riverine and foot) were conducted, including 131 patrols to support the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism. These included regular patrols outside the protection of civilians' sites in Juba, Bentiu, Bor, Malakal and Wau. In areas of Upper Nile, patrol locations included Kaka, Maiwut, Nasir, Pagak, Aburoc, Kodok, Tonga and the west bank of the Nile River. UNMISS also established an austere operating base in Kodok to enable a permanent presence to create a conducive and safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and voluntary return. Confidence-building and integrated patrols were maintained through Unity, with a focus on Adok, Leer, Panyijiar, Mayendit, Koch, Mayom and Buaw, with an additional platoon deployed at Leer. Dynamic air patrols were conducted in Buaw, Koch, Rubkuai and Thonyor, seeking to deter attacks on civilians. In Wau, Western Bahr el-Ghazal, UNMISS deployed additional forces to support the decongestion of the Wau protection of civilians sites and consolidated its presence in Yei, Central Equatoria with the deployment of one company. UNMISS continued its presence via regular integrated

long-duration dynamic air patrols in SPLM/A in Opposition-held areas of Akobo (Jonglei), and Kodok (Upper Nile), to support the delivery of humanitarian aid and enhance understanding of the local situation. The Mission also conducted patrols to Yirol and Maper (Lakes), Panyagor-Poktar and Pochala (Jonglei), Raja and the Wau triangle area (Western Bahr el-Ghazal), and Tambura (Western Equatoria).

37. Under the third tier, establishment of a protective environment, UNMISS engaged with authorities and civil society to create a more conducive environment for the return of displaced populations. This included the decongestion of the Wau protection sites through the creation of conditions for the voluntary return of internally displaced persons by increasing patrols outside the site, strengthening the capacity of the South Sudan National Police Service and other rule of law institutions and fostering dialogue between displaced populations and the Government to help build confidence. UNMISS continued to enhance security through quick-impact projects, building security-related infrastructure in potential areas of return, including Aweil, Wau and Warrap. These initiatives strengthened the Mission's engagement with security authorities to safeguard returnees.

38. The Mission also continued to engage with women on the prevention of sexual- and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, and on enhancing women's participation in the peace process. UNMISS held a number of round-table discussions and related events, which culminated in the South Sudan Open Days Dialogue on Women, Peace and Security, attended by 150 women leaders of civil society, from 13 to 15 March. The Mission provided training and developed a manual on the investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence. A working group on the implementation of a communiqué signed between the United Nations and the Government in October 2014 finalized a plan of action for Government security forces and United Nations and humanitarian partners in order to prevent, mitigate and respond to conflict-related sexual violence.

## B. Monitoring and investigating human rights

39. Violations and abuses of human rights and breaches of international humanitarian law, including the killing and wounding of civilians, sexual violence, forced displacement, looting and destruction of civilian property, ill-treatment and harassment, arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention without trial increased markedly relative to the previous reporting period. During the reporting period, UNMISS verified the killing of 383 civilians (of whom 94 women and 32 children) and 84 injuries (of whom 18 women and 6 children) as a direct result of the conflict. From 21 April, Government forces and armed youth launched offensives in opposition-controlled areas in Leer and Mayendit counties in Unity. UNMISS deployed a rapid investigation team to the area which documented what appeared to be deliberate attacks against civilians, including the elderly, people with disabilities and children. At least 112 women and girls were allegedly raped, including a four-year-old child. During the reporting period, UNMISS documented 56 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence nationwide, affecting a total of 278 women and girls, including 24 children, and one man. Twenty-six incidents were attributed to SPLA and aligned forces with Taban Deng Gai in the Leer and Mayendit military offensive. Twenty-two incidents were attributed to SPLA, six to the pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition, one to the South Sudan National Police Service, and one to Lou Nuer militia. Insecurity and denial of access continue to hamper United Nations investigations. From 17 February to 31 May, 18 incidents of access denial, 12 of which were attributed to SPLA and six to pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition forces, were documented.

40. The Mission documented and verified (or confirmed) human rights violations perpetrated by Government security forces involved in civilian disarmament processes in Eastern Equatoria, Lakes and Warrap, including the killing and wounding of civilians, attacks against humanitarian aid workers, forced displacement, looting, destruction and extortion of civilian property, arbitrary arrest, detention and ill-treatment of civilians who resisted or were perceived to be opposing disarmament. Government disarmament forces reportedly: killed two youths, burned civilian houses and arbitrarily arrested nine youths in Long-Ameth village, Western Lakes, on 19 February; attacked civilians, destroyed civilian property and displaced approximately 8,000 civilians in the area north-east of Rumbek Town on 21 March.

41. Conditions of detention and prison facilities do not meet minimum international standards, with cases of prolonged, arbitrary and proxy detention remaining an issue of concern. On 11 April, the National Security Service detained, for reasons that are unclear, seven Aweil officials, including three members of the State Legislative Assembly, whose legislative immunity was reportedly lifted during an extraordinary sitting of the Assembly. On 22 February, UNMISS followed up on the case of arbitrary arrest by the official disarmament force in Eastern Equatoria, including the prolonged detention without trial, physical assault and ill-treatment of eight civilians at Torit Prison on suspicion of killing four people and wounding two others in Ibahure Village, Lopa County in Eastern Equatoria. Incidents were documented of arbitrary arrest, proxy detention and prolonged detention without trial and human rights violations in the administration of justice affecting minors under the age of criminal responsibility. On 16 March, 12 minors were detained without charge at Bor Police Station, including three children as young as 10 years old. UNMISS advocacy resulted in their release on 19 March.

42. Continued lack of observance of fair trial standards and due process, including cases involving the death penalty, remains a serious concern. On 23 February, the High Court issued a judgment against William John Endley, a South African national, sentencing him to death for insurgency, banditry, sabotage and espionage, terrorism and attempts to overthrow a constitutionally established Government, under section 67 of the South Sudan Criminal Procedure Act. The defendant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeal (Greater Equatoria) on 7 March, arguing failure to consider article 9 of the cessation of hostilities agreement, to comply with the right to legal representation and to subpoena defence witnesses. The appeal case for James Gatdet Dak, the former Press Secretary to the leader of SPLM/A in Opposition, Riek Machar, has been pending since 12 February, when the High Court sentenced him to death. A date for the verdict has yet to be set in the trial of 11 SPLA soldiers charged with various crimes and human rights violations at the Terrain Hotel compound in July 2016, which has been pending since 9 February.

43. On transitional justice, the memorandum of understanding between the African Union and South Sudan on the establishment of a hybrid court for South Sudan has yet to be signed, five months after it was endorsed by the Council of Ministers of South Sudan. In anticipation of the signing of the memorandum of understanding, the African Union Commission has initiated a process for the recruitment of members of a project task team to operationalize the hybrid court.

44. Government institutions continued to restrict the freedoms of expression, media and association. For example, on 27 February, Jonglei authorities issued a ministerial order dissolving all youth associations for allegedly engaging in activities likely to lead to the breakdown of public order. UNMISS expressed concerns over the legality and proportionality of such a measure. On 1 March, the professional body of media editors and managers, the National Editors' Forum, launched a set of editorial guidelines for the South Sudanese media, intended to foster high standards of journalism. On 3 May, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization (UNESCO) and the Union of Journalists of South Sudan organized a forum to mark World Press Freedom Day, to discuss the role of the media in holding state institutions accountable to the public.

45. During the reporting period, UNMISS conducted 47 human rights capacity-building and sensitization activities, benefiting a total of 3,303 participants (of whom 1,597 were women). Of the sessions, 39 sessions included public awareness-raising of human rights and accountability, for 2,620 participants (of whom 1,304 were women) drawn from civil society organizations and other stakeholders. The other eight sessions engaged 683 members of the organized forces (of whom 288 were women). These included a training-of-trainers workshop on human rights for 20 South Sudanese police officers (of whom five were women), conducted with UNDP. As part of internal mainstreaming of human rights, UNMISS also facilitated sessions on the human rights mandate for 680 UNMISS uniformed personnel, including 157 women.

46. During the reporting period, the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting on children in armed conflict documented 135 incidents of grave violations, of which 75 were verified, affecting at least 2,541 children (of whom 1,220 were girls). Almost half (49 per cent) of the verified incidents occurred in the greater Upper Nile region. Reports indicated that SPLA was responsible for 44 per cent of the verified incidents and the pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition for 42 per cent.

47. UNMISS and the United Nations Children's Fund continued to support the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission in the age assessment screening of children associated with armed forces and groups. On 17 April, a batch of 248 children (including 111 girls) were officially released from SPLA forces aligned with Taban Deng Gai and from the South Sudan National Liberation Movement in Western Equatoria. On 17 May, 210 children (including 3 girls) were released by armed groups in Pibor, Jonglei. Coupled with an earlier release in Yambio in February, this brings the number of children released from armed groups in South Sudan this year to 806. UNMISS also facilitated 102 training and sensitization sessions on child protection for 6,826 participants (2,645 of whom were women), drawn from Government-organized forces, public authorities, community members and UNMISS personnel. It also provided child protection training to 522 SPLA personnel (30 of whom were women).

## C. Creating the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance

48. UNMISS continued to provide force protection for the delivery of humanitarian assistance where it is sought. During the reporting period, the Mission conducted protection and humanitarian field assessment missions to both Government- and opposition-controlled areas across the country. Among locations covered by these missions were Aburoc and Kodok in Upper Nile, Bul East, Leer, Mayom, Thoyong and Tomor in Unity, and Tonj East and West in Warrap. Following reports in April that cattle raiding had been preventing non-governmental organizations from delivering aid in Tonj and Warrap, UNMISS advocated with the state authorities to secure roads to enable safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Mission has continued to rehabilitate and improve sections of roads and bridges for both the benefit of the local economy and the delivery of humanitarian aid. In March, UNMISS, with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Ministry of Roads and Bridges, began repair work on a 400-km stretch of road from Juba to Rumbek, through Yirol, a route which is important for the transport of humanitarian assistance as well as for economic activity.

49. The Mine Action Service fulfilled requests for survey and clearance by the International Organization for Migration, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and WFP to support the resettlement of displaced people and return to areas previously affected by the conflict, and to clear areas for use as food distribution sites. The Mine Action Service participated in two humanitarian missions to Mundri, in Central Equatoria, and Raja, in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, carrying out removal and disposal of explosive hazards. During the reporting period, 36 mine action teams were deployed across the country, a total of 15,955,162 $m^2$ was surveyed and released and a further 5,540 explosive hazards and 65,096 small arms and rounds of ammunition were removed and destroyed. The Mine Action Service surveyed and cleared the operating base established in Kodok, Upper Nile. On 7 March, an accident at a demolition site in Melut, Upper Nile, killed one deminer and injured a second and is currently under investigation.

## D. Supporting the implementation of the Agreement and the peace process

50. My Special Representative has continued to use his good offices in support of the peace process in South Sudan, and, in particular, the high-level revitalization forum. This has included meeting with President Museveni in April, ahead of the meeting of the National Liberation Council and the revitalization forum talks, meetings with senior officials in regional states in May and direct engagement with President Kiir to urge the Government's continued and constructive participation in ongoing peace efforts and implementation of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities signed in December 2017. The Special Representative also regularly engaged the diplomatic community and other partners to mobilize and coordinate support to the peace process. On 22 March, the Mission held a workshop in Juba for political parties on the subject of the forum, peace and reconciliation. From 10 to 13 April, the Mission held a public consultation on the forum, attended by approximately 400 people from civil society organizations, including faith-based, women's and youth groups. In coordination with the United Nations country team, the Mission has been engaging with the leaders and steering committee of the national dialogue, advocating for concrete measures to be taken to make the dialogue inclusive and credible.

51. UNMISS continued to provide logistical support and force protection for the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in its operations to implement its monitoring and verification mandate. The Mission has disseminated information to local audiences on the cessation of hostilities agreement, including summary booklets in six languages, flash cards, posters and billboards.

52. The Mission continued to support and prioritize women's representation and active participation in the peace process. During the reporting period, UNMISS disseminated to the Government, members of parliament, political parties, civil society organizations and universities the outcome document from a workshop that it supported, with women politicians, on women's participation in peace processes. The Mission also contributed to a training course, held from 17 to 19 May, for women parliamentarians and members of the national dialogue steering committee, which aimed to enhance women's participation in subsequent phases of the dialogue.

53. UNMISS has continued to provide support for a civil society working group on transitional justice, which during the reporting period conducted further consultations on the legislation for establishing the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing, as proposed in the Agreement. These consultations were conducted between 15 and 29 March in refugee camps in neighbouring countries and were intended to

complement in-country consultations that are to be conducted by a committee established by the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. The consultations with refugees took place in Gambela, Ethiopia, in Jabal Awlya, Sudan, and Kakuma, Kenya.

## VI. Mission staffing, the status of deployments and conduct and discipline

54. As at 3 June 2018, the number of UNMISS civilian personnel stood at 2,676, including 884 international staff members (229 women, 26 per cent), 1,397 national staff members (197 women, 14 per cent) and 396 United Nations Volunteers (123 women, 31 per cent).

55. The police strength as at 3 June stood at 1,654 (out of an authorized 2,101 officers), comprising 625 individual police officers (125 women, 20 per cent), 956 personnel in formed police units (145 women, 15 per cent) and 73 corrections officers (20 women, 27 per cent).

56. As at 3 June, the UNMISS troop strength stood at 13,767 military personnel, comprising 184 military liaison officers (20 women, 11 per cent), 376 military staff officers (52 women, 14 per cent) and 13,207 military contingent personnel (409 women, 3 per cent).

57. Of the authorized 4,000 regional protection force troops, 2,297 have been inducted to date, including 29 out of the 38-person headquarters element and 13 of the 20 planned military liaison officers. Full complements of the Bangladesh Engineering Unit, the Nepalese High Readiness Company and the Chinese and Rwandan infantry battalions have been deployed. The main body of the Ethiopian infantry battalion is scheduled to arrive in Juba between 10 and 26 June.

58. UNMISS continues to implement and strengthen its conduct and discipline measures, with enhanced emphasis on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse initiatives. Apart from conducting internal awareness-raising activities, UNMISS focused extensively on strengthening victim assistance mechanisms. A comprehensive risk assessment exercise was conducted in all UNMISS locations where there are protection of civilians sites, namely Juba, Bor, Malakal, Bentiu and Wau, to identify particular risks and recommend appropriate remedial measures.

59. A tailored training-of-trainers programme on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse was delivered for military personnel. Collaboration is ongoing with the task force on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse. This includes establishing community-based complaint mechanisms throughout South Sudan. UNMISS has recorded and referred three allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, and one allegation of sexual harassment, to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) for investigation. OIOS, which operates independently and reports to the General Assembly, has now finalized its investigation into the allegation of sexual exploitation involving police personnel belonging to a formed police unit in Wau. It is established in the report that members of the unit were involved in transactional sex, on which the United Nations has a zero-tolerance policy. Consistent with existing regulations, the police officers found guilty of misconduct were repatriated on disciplinary grounds and are banned from serving in the United Nations. The OIOS report has also been shared with the Government to support its own investigation.

## VII. Violations of the status-of-forces agreement, international humanitarian law and security of United Nations personnel

60. During the reporting period, 72 incidents of violation of the status-of-forces agreement were recorded by UNMISS, some involving multiple violations.

61. In total, 38 incidents involving movement restrictions attributed to the Government that affected UNMISS operations were recorded during the reporting period. Of particular concern is the number of restrictions affecting the movement of UNMISS personnel monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation. Six new cases of arrest and detention of UNMISS personnel were also reported, including one involving a staff member working at Radio Miraya. In one case, the staff member was also physically assaulted. In four cases, the arrested staff members were released after a few hours, in two cases after one day. The whereabouts of two staff members arrested in 2014 remain unknown. The Government has not provided UNMISS with access to them or information about their condition, despite regular requests.

62. Violations of the obligation to facilitate the entry of UNMISS personnel into South Sudan continue to occur. The practice of collecting fees for visa cancellation upon application for visa extension by UNMISS staff members was brought to the attention of the Government, which adopted prompt measures to discontinue the practice. Aside from these incidents, there were seven recorded cases of UNMISS personnel and contractors being threatened, harassed or assaulted and eight recorded cases of UNMISS property being seized or impounded, sometimes in combination with other incidents. An UNMISS vehicle impounded in Juba on 25 January by the National Police Service has not been returned, despite repeated requests.

63. A total of 30 incidents involving interference with UNMISS activities by the pro-Machar SPLM/A in Opposition were recorded. Some 11 cases were recorded in Central Equatoria, eight in Unity, two in Jonglei, eight in Upper Nile and one in Western Equatoria. Eight of these incidents also resulted in interference with UNMISS-mandated activities related to monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation. UNMISS continues to notify the Government about violations through a monthly record of incidents and in-person meetings with relevant officials.

64. To prevent and mitigate threats to United Nations personnel, premises and assets, the Mission continues to implement security risk management measures, including enhancing the physical protection of United Nations premises, the use of alert and staff tracking systems and closer cooperation, information-sharing and liaison with Government security agencies. The Mission is encouraging United Nations agencies, funds, and programmes to engage consistently with national, regional and local stakeholders to facilitate access in high-risk areas. The Mission is also using its multimedia communications and outreach channels to build public understanding of the Mission's mandate and the role of peacekeepers in building peace and protecting civilians in South Sudan.

## VIII. Observations and recommendations

65. I commend the efforts being made by IGAD, the African Union and the international community with regard to the revitalization forum. I welcome the efforts to narrow the gaps between the parties and to bring about progress in talks. I urge the parties to engage with the mediators in good faith and demonstrate the political will to settle this conflict once and for all. I also welcome the stated intent of IGAD and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to take targeted sanctions against violators of the cessation of hostilities agreement signed in December 2017. There

must be consequences for the flagrant violations of the agreement and a tangible cost for continuing the violence. In this regard, I call on IGAD to expedite the timely publication of reported violations documented by the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism and take action against the individuals who continue to obstruct the peace process, in accordance with the decision of its Council of Ministers of 31 May.

66. It is evident that holding elections in the current political, security and humanitarian environment is unrealistic and would be detrimental to the stabilization of the country. In this respect, I encourage the region and the wider international community to align and coordinate their efforts to support the goal of a lasting and inclusive political settlement and display genuine unity of purpose in support of the peace process.

67. Within South Sudan, the public consultations conducted as part of the national dialogue process have gathered views about the causes of violent conflict in the country and possible solutions. Noting the fundamental challenge represented by the opposition's boycott of the dialogue and shortcomings in the participation of internally displaced persons and refugees, I urge the leaders of the dialogue to intensify their efforts to engage with opposition leaders and citizens, inside and outside the country, to ensure inclusivity, credibility and transparency in the process. At the same time, I encourage those leading and participating in the national dialogue, the revitalization forum and the SPLM reunification process, to ensure that these initiatives are mutually complementary. I also call on the Government to respect the need for the dialogue to be fully inclusive and free from political interference if it is to contribute effectively to the peace process.

68. In parallel with the political priorities, the deterioration of the humanitarian and economic situation in South Sudan is cause for grave concern and demands immediate attention and action. The United Nations country team and partners continue to strive to alleviate the situation. However, the extent of obstructions to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the number of attacks on humanitarian aid workers (with 101 killed since the start of the conflict in December 2013), are totally unacceptable. I therefore call on all parties to refrain in all circumstances from actions that may hamper the delivery of assistance.

69. In March the Security Council renewed the mandate of UNMISS until March 2019, thereby authorizing UNMISS to use all necessary means to perform the tasks specified in the mandate. In response to the escalation of military operations during the reporting period, the Mission has enhanced its efforts to reach areas critical to addressing protection concerns, for example by establishing a new operating base in Kodok and reinforcing our presence of the Mission in Leer, and to verify reported human rights violations, including through the speedy deployment of a rapid investigation team in southern Unity. Further to what has been observed by UNMISS, I note the report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, published on 23 February (A/HRC/37/71). I strongly condemn the horrific gross human rights abuses being committed against civilians, especially the endemic acts of sexual violence targeting women and girls. I impress upon the Government and opposition that they must put an end to heinous violations and take firm action to advance accountability and transitional justice mechanisms. This impunity has to end.

70. In concluding, I would like to reiterate my appreciation to UNMISS military, police and civilian personnel. Under the leadership of my Special Representative, David Shearer, they work courageously to protect civilians in vulnerable situations, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, safeguard human rights and support the peace process. I particularly thank the troop- and police-contributing countries that have provided much-needed uniformed personnel and assets to the Mission. I

further commend the United Nations country team and non-governmental organization partners for their tremendous courage and sacrifice in providing vital humanitarian assistance to the population, in arduous and sometimes dangerous conditions. I also thank my Special Envoy, Nicholas Haysom, for his support to the peace process at the regional level. Lastly, I commend the Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, the former President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, and the African Union High Representative for South Sudan, the former President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konaré, for their commitment to addressing the plight of the civilian population of South Sudan in partnership with the United Nations. I also wish to express my sincere appreciation for the active engagement of the Chair of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki, in the collective effort for peace in South Sudan.

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# Progress towards a settlement in Cyprus

## Report of the Secretary-General

## I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, in its resolution 2398 (2018), in which it renewed the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, requested that the Secretary-General submit a report by 15 June 2018 on progress towards a settlement. The Council also urged the sides and all participants involved to renew their political will and commitment to a settlement under United Nations auspices. The Council further expressed its full support for my good offices to remain available to assist the sides should they jointly decide to re-engage in negotiations with the necessary political will.

2. The present report on my mission of good offices in Cyprus is focused on developments from 12 August 2017 to 21 May 2018. It also provides an update on the activities carried out by the mission under the leadership of my Deputy Special Adviser on Cyprus, Elizabeth Spehar.

## II. Status of the process

3. The previous report on my mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2017/814) contained a review of the course and outcome of settlement negotiations during the period from 15 May 2015 to 11 August 2017. Since then, there has been only minimal official contact between the two sides. Only one informal meeting was held between Mr. Akıncı and Mr. Anastasiades during the reporting period, and there have been no official meetings at the level of negotiators, negotiating teams or expert-level working groups.

4 When I met both leaders bilaterally in New York in September 2017, I reiterated the commitment of the United Nations to Cyprus, including the availability of my good offices for the sides to resume talks as soon as they demonstrated their readiness to re-engage. During the reporting period, I was also in contact with senior-level representatives of the guarantor Powers.

5. To both the leaders in Cyprus and the guarantors, I continually expressed the willingness of the United Nations to support the process if and when they were ready to resume meaningful talks with the requisite political will.



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6. During the reporting period, my Deputy Special Adviser on Cyprus continued to meet the two leaders separately. Mr. Anastasiades repeatedly confirmed his publicly stated position that he was ready to negotiate on the basis of the framework that I had put forward at the reconvened Conference on Cyprus in Crans-Montana, Switzerland, subject to good preparations for a possible reconvening of the Conference, including through shuttle diplomacy. He clarified, however, that no negotiations could be held while "Turkish provocations" continued in the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus.

7. For his part, Mr. Akıncı also confirmed his commitment to the six-point framework that I had introduced in Crans-Montana on 30 June 2017 to resolve the core outstanding issues in a strategic package. He indicated, however, that he would not take part in "open-ended" negotiations; he stood ready to engage in "time-bound, well-structured and results-oriented" talks.

8. With respect to the guarantor Powers, in its public statements since July 2017, Turkey has expressed doubts as to the possibility of reaching a settlement based on the established parameters, given the outcome of the conference in Crans-Montana and past failures. Turkey has nonetheless reiterated its support for a "sustainable settlement" of the Cyprus issue. Greece, for its part, has reiterated its commitment to finding a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and the framework that I had set out in Crans-Montana. Lastly, the United Kingdom has emphasized its strong support for a comprehensive settlement and its readiness to do its part to achieve that goal.

9. On 7 January 2018, "parliamentary" elections were held in the north of the island. Subsequently, the Republic of Cyprus held two rounds of presidential elections, on 28 January and 4 February, in which the incumbent, Mr. Anastasiades, secured a second term. There was some hope on both sides that, once the elections concluded, the parties might engage in discussions regarding a possible resumption of talks.

10. Tensions over hydrocarbon activities, however, began to escalate early in 2018. Most significantly, on 9 February, an Italian energy company was prevented by Turkish military ships from gaining access to a planned drilling area in the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus. In mid-March, the company's drillship departed the eastern Mediterranean without having been able to conduct its intended exploratory drilling.

11. On 16 April, the two leaders held an informal meeting in the United Nations Protected Area under the auspices of my Deputy Special Adviser. Both leaders underscored that the meeting did not constitute a resumption of negotiations but did provide an opportunity to ascertain "where they stood" currently on the Cyprus issue.

12. At the end of the informal meeting, the leaders confirmed that they remained at an impasse. It was nonetheless acknowledged that the meeting had been important and necessary after more than nine months without direct contact between the leaders. As noted in a statement issued by the Deputy Special Adviser after the meeting, the leaders had a frank and open exchange of views during a two-hour tête-à-tête discussion.

13. Two weeks after that informal meeting, on 30 April, Mr. Akıncı made a public statement in which he said: "If the Greek Cypriot side is ready to accept the Guterres framework as it was presented without diluting, let's declare it as a strategic package agreement." He added that, through such an announcement, the negotiations would be meaningful, as they would be held with the aim of filling the gaps under the strategic agreement. In response, Mr. Anastasiades issued a written statement on 2 May in which he replied that, if Mr. Akıncı accepted the proposed framework "as it was presented to the sides on 4 July 2017, this is a positive development". He called

upon Mr. Akıncı and "primarily Turkey" to "clarify whether they accept" specific provisions of the framework relating to security and guarantees and foreign troops. Those statements led to a further public exchange between the sides that suggested that the leaders had diverging interpretations of certain aspects of the framework. The consultations that I intend to launch, through a senior United Nations official, in the coming weeks will provide an opportunity for the sides to formally clarify where they stand on the issue.

**Other features**

14. Since the closing of the Conference on Cyprus, there has been scant effort to prepare citizens for a renewed round of talks. Interest in the Cyprus problem has noticeably waned, as citizens' belief in a possible settlement in the near future seems to have sharply diminished on both sides. Notwithstanding repeated encouragement from the international community, the leaders have not taken new trust-building or confidence-building measures, even though a number of such initiatives could be implemented jointly or unilaterally.

15. At the same time, the two leaders have reiterated on various occasions their interest in continuing the valuable work of the technical committees on intercommunal activities aimed at improving the daily lives of Cypriots. Both leaders have held periodic bilateral discussions with their respective coordinators for the technical committees in order to receive updates on their work. Further attention from the leaders to the work of the committees would be welcome. Since July 2017, there has been no discernible change in the operation of the committees. Those which have historically operated well have continued to do so, while others remain less effective or do not meet at all. This situation has resulted from various factors, including a lack of material and organizational support, as well as limited institutional support for their work. The leaders' recent focus on accelerating the work at two additional crossing points, as announced in 2015 and taken up by the Technical Committee on Crossings, with the intention of opening them in the coming few months has been a positive development.

16. The Security Council has consistently highlighted a general lack of outreach by the sides to their communities and a lack of integration of civil society into the settlement negotiations themselves. There has been a strong perception among both Cypriots and independent observers that negotiations, and the peace process more broadly, have been far removed from the public.

17. Nevertheless, a growing number of civil society actors became increasingly vocal and visible in the public debate, in particular during the crucial latter phases of the most recent round of negotiations. While not great in number, those voices strove to broaden the public debate and engage their respective political leaders. Also of note were various initiatives that attempted to bridge the gap between the negotiations and the public by bringing together particular sectors or actors from both sides for dialogue. Such initiatives include the Religious Track of the Cyprus Peace Process, under the auspices of the Embassy of Sweden; an ongoing political parties dialogue facilitated by the Embassy of Slovakia; and a business community round table comprising Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot private sector representatives convened by the Embassy of Germany.

## III. Activities of the good offices mission

18. Over the past months, my Deputy Special Adviser and my good offices mission have met continually with political party leaders, civil society organizations, women's groups, religious leaders, members of the diplomatic community,

representatives of European bodies and other key actors. All interlocutors have expressed concern about the lack of direct and regular contact between the leaders and about the deteriorating mood on the island with regard to the peace process. In both communities, public expectations regarding a possible resumption of talks are noticeably low.

19. My Deputy Special Adviser and my good offices mission have also continued their communication and coordination with partner institutions, including the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Although some institutions have reduced or reoriented their presence in Cyprus as a direct consequence of the lack of talks, all partners have nonetheless signalled their willingness to continue to think creatively about preparing for and implementing any potential future settlement.

20. The Office of the Special Adviser has also used the recent period of reflection for self-examination and learning. Under the direction of my Deputy Special Adviser, my good offices mission has completed extensive record-keeping, internal analysis and lessons-learned exercises to reflect on the past three years of negotiations, to analyse the convergences reached to date and to identify potential improvements to the process should the sides jointly decide to restart negotiations.

## IV. Observations

21. Ten months after the closing of the reconvened Conference on Cyprus in Crans-Montana, there has been no further progress towards a settlement. The current stalemate has further lowered expectations on the island, despite the unprecedented advances witnessed during the most recent round of talks. As a consequence, trust between the leaders and between their respective communities, and among the parties overall, has suffered.

22. In the most recent round of negotiations, the two leaders had reached a number of critical milestones — and had agreed on many of the key aspects of a settlement — before even arriving in Crans-Montana. The leaders had elaborated a shared vision of Cyprus as a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality and effective decision-making, anchored firmly within the European Union, and they had made progress on property and territory issues. At the Conference on Cyprus held in Geneva in January 2017, the parties had underscored the need for mutually acceptable solutions regarding security and guarantees that addressed the concerns of both communities, in line with the overarching principle that the security of one community could not come at the expense of the security of the other.

23. The leaders and their negotiating teams had also paid close attention to the economic aspects of the settlement. A number of independent experts have underscored that the greater opportunities and benefits stemming from a comprehensive settlement would generate faster and more sustainable economic growth in both communities. In the event of a settlement, higher growth rates would translate into higher average incomes, thus improving standards of living and leading to a convergence of incomes between the two communities and with higher-income European Union countries.

24. The underlying logic of a solution within the parameters of the United Nations and building on the existing body of work remains compelling. I am still convinced that a comprehensive settlement would bring substantial benefits and opportunities to both communities, as well as contributing to overall peace and stability in the region. At the strategic and political levels, a settlement would help to repair decades of

division and mistrust, ease tensions that could escalate into conflict, and assist in cultivating neighbourly relations between traditionally adversarial countries in the eastern Mediterranean.

25. As I noted in my previous report, it is my firm belief that, in order for a process of such complexity and political sensitivity to be successful, it is necessary to follow a balanced and comprehensive package approach comprising specific key issues. Should the sides jointly decide to resume talks, the six-point framework that I introduced in Crans-Montana could form the basis for negotiations aimed at reaching a strategic agreement and paving the way for a comprehensive settlement. The framework contained elements relating to territory, political equality, property, equivalent treatment, and security and guarantees. I proposed it in an attempt to help the parties to resolve the remaining core outstanding issues interdependently and overcome the challenge of negotiating across chapters.

26. The year 2018 marks the 10-year anniversary of the formation of the bicommunal technical committees responsible for working on confidence-building measures aimed at improving the everyday lives of Cypriots and facilitating greater interaction among them. I encourage the leaders to redouble their efforts to support the technical committees established under their auspices and to continue their efforts to implement the confidence-building measures that they jointly agreed upon in 2015. In particular, I urge both sides to follow through on the commitment of the leaders to accelerate the work on the crossing points, as agreed upon in 2015, and to open them without further delay. I also encourage the leaders to pursue the implementation of unilateral confidence-building measures that could have a positive impact on the overall atmosphere on the island and could contribute to the restoration of mutual trust, both at the negotiating table and between the communities.

27. One long-standing feature of the Cyprus settlement negotiations has been the confidentiality of the process. That practice was established in order to provide space for the leaders to strike difficult bargains at the negotiating table. At the same time, it has hampered their ability to provide information on progress made and to prepare the two communities for a deal. I therefore urge the leaders to think of mechanisms by which, in possible resumed negotiations, they could preserve the confidentiality of the negotiations while also engaging in public outreach and providing information, through which both sides could prepare their communities in a timely manner.

28. Another issue raised in relation to the negotiations during past rounds has been the question of including civil society and other actors in the settlement process. While the leaders and negotiators communicate with their constituents independently, the settlement process has not historically featured formal channels or initiatives seeking input from or consultation with the public, such as those employed in other peace processes. I believe that if negotiations are resumed, the involvement and contribution of civil society, especially women's groups and young people, would need to be strengthened to ensure that their voices are heard and that they become instrumental in gathering and mobilizing greater support for the peace process in society at large. In this regard, in relation to existing bicommunal dialogues among sectors of society and groups, I urge the leaders to consider supporting those initiatives to help to garner and mobilize public support for and involvement in the peace process.

29. During the most recent round of negotiations, women, including my Deputy Special Adviser and the staff of my good offices mission, were generally well represented in both negotiating teams and contributed substantively to the talks. That inclusivity is commendable, and it should be further strengthened in a possible resumed process. However, the participation of women at the negotiating table is only one aspect of the women and peace and security agenda promoted by the Security

Council and is necessary for inclusive, just and sustainable peace outcomes. The process should also be designed to incorporate contributions from women in civil society, and the substance of the agreement must be gender-sensitive to ensure that the concerns and needs of all members of society, including women, are reflected. Evidence from peace processes from around the globe has confirmed that the meaningful participation of women deepens peacebuilding efforts measurably and leads to more sustainable peace. I encourage the leaders to revitalize the Technical Committee on Gender Equality. In this context, a gender-sensitive socioeconomic impact assessment could be a useful area for future research.

30. With respect to the disputes over hydrocarbons off the coast of Cyprus, I continue to monitor developments closely and with concern. I wish to reiterate that the natural resources found in and around Cyprus should benefit both communities and should provide a strong incentive to find a durable solution to the Cyprus problem. I recall that the Greek Cypriot leader and the Turkish Cypriot leader previously agreed in their negotiations that natural resources in a unified Cyprus would lie within the competence of the future federal Government. With new rounds of exploratory drilling expected before the end of the year, I urge restraint and reiterate my call for a peaceful resolution of differences and for serious efforts to avoid any further escalation and to defuse tensions.

31. After significant hope and expectations were raised during the 2015–2017 phase of the negotiations, the continued absence of dialogue nearly one year after Crans-Montana and the uncertain prospects for the future are a serious cause for concern for many Cypriots and the international community alike.

32. I believe that there is still scope for the sides to act responsibly and decisively in order to chart a common way forward for the island. In the near future, I intend to send a senior United Nations official to conduct in-depth consultations with the parties. Those consultations will provide a more formal, structured and detailed channel for the parties to convey to the United Nations the outcomes of their reflection since Crans-Montana and to help to determine whether conditions have matured at this stage for a meaningful process. I encourage the parties to recognize the importance of the exercise and to seize the opportunity accordingly.

33. The future of the island is the responsibility of all Cypriots, but the leaders bear the primary responsibility for the negotiations. Should they jointly agree to resume talks with the intent of coming to a comprehensive settlement, they will need to demonstrate the strongest political commitment, courage and determination. They will also need to recapture their sense of urgency, address the erosion of trust and deliver strong and unambiguous signals of political will. To be able to conclude a mutually beneficial deal, they will need to engage their communities and explain the benefits of the solution and the importance of compromise on both sides.

34. The guarantor Powers will also, without doubt, need to do their part and engage in the process determinedly and constructively. Furthermore, the Security Council — and, indeed, all friends of Cyprus, in particular the European Union — will need to increase their support for and encouragement of the leaders and all parties concerned. They will need to continue to speak clearly and with one voice about the opportunities and benefits of a comprehensive settlement, but at the same time unequivocally about the risks and costs of maintaining the status quo or backsliding from the gains already made.

35. In closing, I wish to thank my Deputy Special Adviser and the personnel serving in my good offices mission in Cyprus for the dedication and commitment with which they have discharged the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.